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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 is a critical survey of the
literature on the real exchange rate and welfare. First paper researches on welfare asso-
ciated with two different productivities and the real exchange rate. The second paper
classifies countries by regions and analyzes the effects of the real exchange rate. The
emerging Asian countries are more export-intensive, so the real depreciation stimulate
their economic growth while other emerging countries grow faster with real apprecia-
tion. These results rationalize the different growth patterns in different regions.
In Chapter 2, I studied the role of foreign reserves. Some papers have argued that
countries accumulate foreign reserves in order to deteriorate terms of trade to increase
welfare. On the other hand, the optimal tariff theory argues that tariffs can increase the
welfare of a country by improving its terms of trade. This paper provides a plausible
explanation for the different foreign reserves policies regarding terms of trade. I build
an endogenous growth model of a small open economy with technological spillovers
generated from exports. Internalizing the growth effects from these externalities, the
government decides whether to accumulate foreign reserves or to borrow from abroad.
This paper finds that when the export externalities are large enough, it is optimal to
hold positive foreign reserves to achieve faster growth through terms of trade deteriora-
tion. However, when the export externalities are small, the government holds negative
foreign reserves.
In Chapter 3, Jorge Mondragon and I propose a stochastic general equilibrium model
of sovereign default with endogenous default risk in order to explain the interest rate
behavior in emerging economies. We incorporate two types of shocks to cover foreign
and domestic uncertainty. We define GDP and terms of trade shock as the domestic
and the foreign uncertainty respectively. The model is able to successfully increase the
dispersion of sovereign interest rates when GDP shocks are above the trend. This result
seems to suggest that terms of trade is a good candidate to explain the volatility of
interest rates in small open economies when they are not under recessions or crises.
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Chapter 1
The real exchange rate and the
welfare
1.1 The Productivity and the real exchange rate
Coresetti, Martin, and Pesenti (2005) reveal the relationship between welfare and the
real exchange rate and also terms of trade. More specifically, this paper research on
welfare implications associated with productivity, market size, government spending,
and trade liberalization. When those variables change, the prices such as real exchange
rate, terms of trade, and CPI (the price level of the consumption basket) will be affected
and this leads to change in the welfare of the Home country as well as trading partner
countries.
This paper explains the movement of those variable by building a two-country model
with monopolistic competition. Each firm in two countries produces different goods,
which means this model has a feature of varieties. The consumer’s preference depends
on the varieties of goods. When these countries export, transaction cost will be in-
duced. These components of the model generate the key results of this paper. The
two-country and the transaction costs are adapted to analyze the international trans-
mission between the two countries. The effects of the change in one country spill over
into the other country so the welfare of two countries change simultaneously.1 Also, the
1The spillover effects in this paper do not refer the technological spillovers from more advanced
country to less developed country in externality literature. This illustrates how much of the changes in
1
2imperfect competitions and love of varieties create a source of welfare gains. As more
various goods are produced and consumed, the consumer’s utility increases. In addition
to varieties, the lower prices will also increase welfare since the lower prices allow the
consumer to purchase at a cheaper price. Indeed, the welfare depends on both prices
such as the real exchange rate and CPI and the consumer’s preference over varieties.
There are two types of productivities. One is productivity in the production function
and the other is productivity related to creating a new variety (or starting a new firm2).
These two productivities are expressed in terms of costs. The high productivity related
to the production reduces the cost of input, so more outputs will be produced with
smaller inputs. Meanwhile, the second productivity is shown in the form of reduction
of the entry cost. In other words, when productivity is high, more firms easily start
producing a new variety since the entry cost becomes cheaper.
The key results
The main findings of the paper are documented as follows.
1. When productivity in Home country increases, the price of Home goods become
cheaper which leads to a decrease in profits of firms in Home country. The decrease in
profits decrease the incentive of starting a new business, so the number of varieties are
lower.
2. The lower varieties mean the domestic goods supplied to the world will be smaller.
However, the high productivity increases domestic production and deteriorate the real
exchange rate and the terms of trade
3. When market size in Home country is bigger, the terms of trade improve. Fur-
thermore, the output and consumption will be higher than other country and the real
exchange rate depreciates.
4. The international spillover from domestic productivity gains to the Foreign coun-
try shows different patterns depends on the type of productivity. The rise in production
productivity affects Foreign welfare ambiguously while the reduction of the entry costs
one country transmit to the other country.
2Creating a new variety and starting a new firm are the same in this model since each firm produces
different goods.
3increases the welfare of the Foreign country by increasing the number of varieties.
5. The decrease in transaction costs has two effects: positive effects from lower cost
and negative effects from the lower number of varieties. However, the numerical exercise
shows the former effects are greater than the latter one.
The model
There are two countries in this world: Home and Foreign. All goods are tradable goods.
There are three agents in this economy: Consumers, firms, and a government. This
model is written in nominal terms, so there is a nominal exchange rate, price of do-
mestic goods and Foreign goods denominated in the Home currency and the Foreign
currency.
consumers There is a representative consumer in this economy consume the
basket of differentiated goods produced by domestic firms and Foreign firms. The goods
are produced by the firms in the two countries are all different. The utility function of
the consumer is a function of the basket of consumption goods and labor.3
Ut =
C
1− 1
ψ
t
1− 1ψ
− κlt (1.1)
The fact that the consumer cares about the number of varieties is the crucial factor
to analyze international spillovers.
The consumers purchase the goods produced in domestic firms and also imported
goods produced in the Foreign country. She pays taxes in a lump-sum fashion. In
addition, she invests in firms in both countries but this investment is intra-temporal,
meaning that the return will be generated in the same period as a form of profits. The
sources of income are labor income and profits.
To obtain the main results, the utility-based consumer price index (CPI) is con-
structed. This utility-based CPI consists of the sum of prices of domestic varieties and
3CRRA for the consumption basket and constant marginal disutility over labor supply.
4prices of Foreign varieties denominated in domestic currency. In addition, for the sim-
plicity the elasticity of substitution across varieties is constant. From the first-order
conditions, the following equation shows the relationship between the basket of con-
sumption goods and the aggregate price level (CPI).
Ct = P
−ψ
t (1.2)
where ψ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
firms Firms in both countries produce the differentiated goods, denoted by
nt for the Home country and n
∗
t for the Foreign country. Each variety is produced by
using labor as an only input in a linear fashion.
Yt(h) = αtlt(h) (1.3)
where h represents the variety at Home and αt is labor productivity and the same
for all firms in the Home.
At time period t, agents decide whether to open a new firm and produce a new
variety. To set up a firm, the firm has to pay the fixed entry cost qt. This entry cost
depends on the labor productivity of νt, which is associated with creating a new variety.
The investment from the consumer is used to finance this fixed entry cost. Furthermore,
when firms export, they have to pay ‘iceberg’ transaction costs.
Mentioned above, there are two productivities in this paper: α in the production
function and ν in the entry cost function. They play a different role in welfare analysis.
Government The government purchases the varieties produced only domes-
tically and finances from the representative consumer. The government has a balanced
budget constraint. The demand for each variety has the same price elasticity and the
price index for the public goods is a function of prices of domestically produced varieties.
5Main results and Mechanism
From the profit functions putting the optimality conditions in both countries, they show
some main results related to international spillovers. First, when market size at Home
becomes larger while other factors are constant, profits at Home increase more than
those in Foreign. Second, when there are more firms at Home, profits at Home decrease
more than those in Foreign. Third, the real depreciation of Home currency increase the
profits at Home. Fourth, the increase in labor productivity in the production function
decrease in Home profits. This is due to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
which is less than one. Even though the Home price drops, the demand does not in-
crease sufficiently so the sales revenue decrease.
The effects of the increase in the number of varieties can be examined by the equilib-
rium profits functions. There are two opposite effects. The higher number of varieties
decrease the price of the consumption bundle, so more consumption is available, which
results in welfare gains. This increases the demand for goods and the firms’ profits.
On the other hand, due to the intra-tempral substitution, the demands decrease and
the profits also drop. The net effects depend on the value of inter- and intra-temporal
elasticity of substitution.
Consider the case where the trade costs drop, which is represented as trade liber-
alization in this paper. Lowering the transaction costs increase demand for goods and
profits. This allows more firms to enter the market. However, more firms are engaged in
a more competitive environment. In this case, the number of varieties will be dropped.
In terms of productivity, two different productivities are considered separately. If
Home productivity in the production function increase, then it will lower the price of
goods and profits for the Home firms also lower.4 This makes the domestic firms exit
the market and the number of varieties becomes smaller. In this situation, Home goods
become relatively cheaper than Foreign goods, so the terms of trade deteriorate and also
the real exchange rate depreciates. In this situation, the welfare gain for the Foreign
country is ambiguous. Due to the lower prices of Home goods, the Foreign country can
import at a cheaper price, which increases the welfare of the Foreign country. However,
the number of varieties decreases so this negatively affects the welfare of the Foreign
4Since price elasticity is φ < 1
6country. As the second productivity, consider the higher productivity involved in the
entry cost so now firms are able to enter the market at a lower cost. This directly in-
creases the number of varieties at Home, and thus the terms of trade improve. However,
the real exchange rate depreciates. Moreover, the increase in market size generates real
exchange depreciation and the terms of trade improvement.
The last analysis is about welfare and international spillovers. The welfare at
Home increases according to lower trade costs, higher productivities, and larger mar-
ket size. These results are consistent with the mechanism mentioned above. However,
the spillovers on the Foreign countries are undetermined. To investigate it, this paper
presents the results obtained from the numerical exercise with some reasonable param-
eters. From the computation, the increase in Home productivity in the production
function increase both domestic and Foreign welfare. Moreover, two countries experi-
ence welfare gains with large size of Home market.
Relationship with existing theories
This paper addresses several arguments insisted in previous literature in a different
point of view. From the model in this paper, the authors show theoretically differenti-
ated mechanism. The first argument that this paper address differently is that higher
growth of a country induces the deterioration of the terms of trade. This paper insists
that the opposite result is possible. Indeed, it can be a case that faster growth leads
to the improvement of the terms of trade. This paper explains this possibility by in-
vestigating the relationship between the terms of trade and two types of productivities.
When the firms at Home can produce more efficiently with higher productivity, this
lowers the marginal costs of production and the terms of trade deteriorate. At the same
time, if the productivity related to firm’s entry costs is also high, then, this improves
the terms of trade. Depending on the magnitude from two productivities, the terms of
trade might deteriorate, but also might improve. In this regard, this paper can explain
two cases.
The argument that faster growth can be achieved with any range of change of the
terms of trade is, in fact, supported by other literature as well. Acemoglu and Ventura
7(2002) support the idea that fast growth countries, which is featured by the higher ac-
cumulation of capital, experience the deterioration of the terms of trade. Meanwhile,
Gagnon (2004) provides the theoretical model showing that the export-oriented coun-
tries can achieve faster growth without deteriorating the terms of trade. In addition,
Bleaney and Greenaway (2001) study 14 sub-Saharan African countries and show that
faster growth is associated with improvement of the terms of trade. This paper provides
a wide range of explanations regarding the growth and terms of trade.
The second argument that this paper shows a different view from the previous lit-
erature is about trade liberalization. This paper provides the possibility that trade
liberalization leads to a decrease in the number of varieties. This is against the argu-
ment that liberalization expands the number of varieties (Melitz (2003), Goldberg at
el (2010)) and Debaere and Mostashari (2010)). This paper deal with two different
effects of trade liberalization. One is a lower cost argument and the other one is higher
competition argument. The former one starts with lowering the trade cost which in-
creases the demand for domestic goods. This results in an increase in profits, so more
firms enter the goods market and the number of varieties increases. On the other hand,
higher liberalization makes higher competition with the Foreign firms, and thus more
firms exist. By comparing these two effects, the number of varieties is determined.
I believe that more empirical work that supports the main point of this paper would
make the theoretical model and mechanism more valuable. This paper addresses some
debatable points mentioned above so it seems to be important that they provide empir-
ical evidence.5 In addition, choosing the two countries that fit the story can be helpful.
For instance, to see the effects of liberalization, the U.S. and Canada might work for
the story since they are big economies and members in NAFTA. Thus, analyzing the
number of export varieties before and after NAFTA can give empirical evidence for their
argument.
5Broda and Weinstin (2006), and Feenstra and Kee (2008) study the number of varieties in their
paper. Especially Feensta and Kee (2008) uses the export variety so the measure of export variety can
be used.
8Introduction of Tariffs
The model in this paper includes the iceberg trade costs so when the firms export,
they have to pay them. In this regard, the trade liberalization is characterized by the
reduction of these trade costs. Meanwhile, trade liberalization is often expressed by the
reduction of tariffs. Thus, it is expected that introducing the tariffs instead of iceberg
trade costs also provide an interesting analysis.
As introducing tariff on imported goods, there are few things have to be changed. The
budget constraint of the consumer at Home includes the tariffs while the iceberg trade
costs do not affect the consumer’s decision. Due to the tariffs, the consumer has to pay
a higher price for Foreign goods. The budget constraint becomes
∫ nt
0
pt(h)ct(h)dh+
∫ n?t
0
(1 + τ)pt(f)ct(f)df + It ≤ ωtlt + Πt (1.4)
Where h and f refer to the Home and Foreign varieties respectively, and τ represents
import tariffs that Home imposes. Due to the tariffs, the consumer’s decision will be
different from the iceberg trade cost scenario.
In addition to the consumer budget constraint, the government budget constraint is
also affected by the tariffs. Since the government spends on only domestic varieties, the
expenditure in the left-hand side consists of Home varieties. Meanwhile, the government
finances the government expenditure with import tariffs imposed on Foreign varieties.∫ nt
0
pt(h)Gt(h)dh =
∫ n∗t
0
τpt(f)ct(f)df (1.5)
In this setting, we can analyze the effects of trade liberalization and government
spending. Different from the iceberg trade costs, trade liberalization, which is lower
tariffs, not only firms but also the consumer changes its decisions and the welfare will
be changed as well. It is expected that with lower tariffs, the consumer’s welfare in-
creases since she can purchase imported goods at cheaper prices. However, firms might
be hurt since they will be surrounded by more severe competition with Foreign firms.
Moreover, when the government increases its spending, it must finance resources from
the tariff revenue. In this situation, the import tariffs become an endogenous variable
9so that the government can choose the optimal level of tariffs. This can provide policy
implication regarding tariffs and the welfare analysis associated with the terms of trade
and the real exchange rate is also available.
1.2 The different regions and the real exchange rate
Alfaro, Cunat, Fadinger, and Liu (2018) provide evidence that the benefits to changes
in the real exchange rate vary depending on how much a country is focused on exports
or imports. This paper embodies various factors: exports, imports, R&D investment,
productivity, and financial constraint. More specifically, this paper analyzes the effects
of the real exchange rate on firms’ behavior such as investment in R&D, exports, and
productivity growth. Also, the crucial analysis is conducted based on different regions:
emerging Asian countries. other emerging countries, and advanced countries. This pa-
per provides different implication depending on the regional classification.
The main argument of this paper is that in emerging Asian countries, the depreci-
ation of the real exchange rate has a positive impact on the growth of TFP in terms
of firm-level because they allow firms to invest more in R&D and more exports. On
the contrary, the effects of real depreciations are shown opposite in emerging countries
in Eastern Europe and Latin America. This phenomenon is derived by the fact that
the emerging Asian countries are export-intensive while other emerging countries are
import-intensive. Thus, the effects of the change in the real exchange rate show re-
versely in these two regions. Meanwhile, the advanced countries do not seem to be
affected by the changes in the real exchange rate and this is because the import and
export intensities are fairly similar in those advanced countries.
To investigate the mechanism of the model, consider the emerging Asian country
case featuring an export-intensive country. The depreciation of the real exchange rate
induces a higher demand for exports and results in higher profits of firms. These high
profits allow the firms to borrow more and invest more in R&D. Hence, firms in emerg-
ing Asian countries can achieve higher productivity with real depreciations. The other
emerging countries, in fact, have exactly the opposite mechanism. The real deprecia-
tions make imported goods more expensive so the firms in those countries suffer from
10
higher input prices. This occurs since those countries heavily rely on imports. This
decrease the profits of the firms, which means that the firms cannot finance the money
that is used in R&D. As a result, the growth of productivity will be lower with real
depreciations. However, in the case of advanced countries, the positive effects of the real
depreciation on exports are canceled out with its negative effects on imports so there is
a negligible effect on productivity.
Stylized facts
There are several stylized facts regarding the real exchange rate and the firm’s behavior.
First, the emerging Asian countries show the positive relationship between the real
depreciation and growth of productivity, sale, and cash flow. Also, real depreciations
allow more firms to engage in R&D and export.
Second, the real depreciation in other emerging economies are negatively associated
with the growth of productivity, sale and cash flow. In addition, the probability of
invest in R&D and export is low.
Third, the real depreciations have no impacts on those variables mentioned above
in the firm-level.
Fourth, the real depreciations are positive for exporters but negative for importers
who import intermediate goods.
Fifth, when comparing emerging countries with advanced countries, it can be con-
cluded that the probability that firms export is relatively higher in emerging Asia while
the probability that firms import is relatively higher in other emerging countries (Latin
America, Eastern Europe). In the same regard, Asian countries have higher export-
intensity; on the other hand, other emerging countries have higher import-intensity.
Sixth, Medium, and large firms consider two factors when choosing R&D investment.
One is the level of internal cash flow and the other is the degree of development of the
financial market. Cash flows are an important issue for other emerging economies and
have also shown some impact on emerging Asian economies. However, it does not show
much influence in advanced economies.
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Empirical Evidence
To provide the empirical evidence, the authors use firm-level data and different data sets
are used to supplement the deficiencies of one data source. There are two data sources
to obtain information on sales, cash flow, R&D participation, export, and import in the
firm-level. The analysis includes yearly based unbalance panel of manufacturing firms in
76 emerging economies and 23 advanced economies from 2001 to 2010. They construct
the data for the change in the real exchange rate and define it in the following way.
log(ec,t) = log(
1
Pc,t
) (1.6)
The real exchange rate is defined as the relative price based on the U.S. and calcu-
lated with the PPP-based GDP price level. Hence, Pc,t represents the GDP price level
in PPP. In addition, they also construct the export- and import-weighted real exchange
rate using bilateral sectoral export and import data. Thus, this data is country and
sectoral specific. This allows the controlling country and time fixed effects.
They found that one percent of the real depreciation leads to increase in all of the
growth of TFP, growth of sales, growth of cash flow, R&D probability, and export en-
try rate in emerging Asian countries. On the contrary, for the case of other emerging
countries, the real depreciations significantly decrease only growth of TFP and growth
of sales. In addition, there is no significant effect on any of these variables in advanced
countries except cash flow, which shows a negative coefficient. They also ran other
regressions to check the robustness. First, they conducted with the data excluding the
financial crisis period. Second, they used IV instrument for the real exchange rate.
In addition, they used export- and import-weighted sector-specific real exchange rate
instead of the real exchange rate and analyzed the results.
These different regressions suggest consistent results for the emerging Asian coun-
tries and the developed countries, but the consistency of the results seem to be weaker
for other emerging countries. When excluding crisis years, the decrease in TFP mea-
sured with gross output is not significant and the same result is shown when export-
and import weighted real exchange rates are used.6 Thus, it might be hasty to conclude
6The data period excluding the year of the global crisis is from 2000 to 2008.
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that the results in other emerging countries are robust.
Furthermore, they divided firms into exporters and importers and investigated how
the depreciation of the real exchange rate affect those firms. The higher TFP growth
of exporters is associated with the real depreciations in all emerging countries while
negative TFP growth of importers is shown. Moreover, the probability of engaging in
R&D is significantly affected by the combination of the size of firms, cash flow, and
the level of financial development.7 The small firms do not show significant results,
but medium and large firms show that the firms with higher growth of cash flow in the
highly developed financial markets are more likely to invest in R&D.
The data analysis in this paper is based on the manufacturing firms. However, there
are tradable services suggested by Jensen and Kletzer (2010). They classify tradable
jobs based on offshorability, which means services that can be provided without using
the internet or face-to-face. The firms providing these services can be included in the
analysis and then the more detailed investigation can be possible.
Theoretical Framework
This paper builds a small open economy model with heterogeneous firms to investigate
the mechanism supporting the empirical evidence. The important feature of the model is
that the firms make a decision of investment in R&D and exporter and importer status.
The firms differ by log-productivity, ωi,t + I,t where ωi,t follows a Markov process and
I,t is iid with mean 0 and standard deviation, σ. In addition, the aggregate variables
are taken as given to the firms so the real exchange rate is exogenous in this model.
The real exchange rate follows an AR(1) process.
log(et) = γ0 + γ1 log(et−1) + νt (1.7)
The production function is a function of productivity, capital, labor, and materials.
The material is made of domestic intermediate good and imported intermediate goods.
7The size of firms are classified based on quartiles and financial development is measured by private
credit/GDP.
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The price of the material depends on the price of domestic and imported intermediate
goods and the real exchange rate. The real depreciation lowers the domestic factor
price and relatively increase the imported price. This generates the fact that the real
depreciations are good for exporters, bad for importers.
Furthermore, each firm faces a demand function for its good. Since firms are mo-
nopolists for their goods, they have a constant mark-up. If a firm is a non-importing
firm, then revenue does not depend on the exchange rate but importing firm’s revenue
is negatively affected by the real exchange rate through imported intermediate pries.
The exporting firms obtain higher revenue with real depreciation because the exports
become cheaper. If the exporting firm also imports, then the revenue is lower since
imported intermediates more expensive.
There are four types of firms: firms that export and import, exporting firm, import-
ing firm, firm that sells only domestically. The firms trading internationally have to pay
a fixed cost. By comparing profits from four cases, firms choose one of the types. Also,
these firms have to choose whether they invest in R&D or not. When they invest in
R&D, they have to pay a fixed cost, but it allows higher productivity as shown in Aw,
Roberts, and Xu (2011). To support the idea that the small firms are not associated
with R&D investment, this model includes the financial constraint. This illustrates the
situation where the R&D fixed cost should be borrowed, but each firm can borrow as
much as proportional to its profits. Thus, the small firms, characterized by less produc-
tivity firms, do not engage in R&D since their profits are more likely to be low.
Simulation and Mechanism
The results simulated with estimated parameters well support the empirical evidence.
They showed three cases: 25% of the real depreciation, 25% of the real appreciations,
and 12.5% of the real depreciation. In the case of emerging Asian countries, with 25%
depreciation, the revenue TFP growth increases up to 6.5%. By dividing by components,
we can see that the demand part dominates the import part. On the other hand, in
the case of other emerging economies, because the effects of the import part are greater
than those of the demand part, the revenue TFP growth shows negative with 25% of
the real depreciation. Meanwhile, in the advanced countries, the change of the revenue
14
TFP growth is close to zero since two effects from the import part and the demand
part are very similar. When unexpected the real appreciations hit the economy, all the
results are opposite to the real depreciation cases, but the magnitude is much smaller.
The revenue TFP in emerging Asia is -2% which is a quite similar magnitude that can
be obtained by 12.5% of the real depreciation.8
The mechanism of these results are certainly clear. The differences among differ-
ent regions come from export- and import- intensity. The emerging Asian countries
are export-oriented countries, so the real depreciations lead to higher exports inducing
higher profits. This higher profits enable the exporting firms to borrow more for paying
the fixed cost of R&D investment. With higher R&D, the firms’ productivity increases.
On the other hand, other emerging countries are featured by the import-intensive coun-
tries. Thus, real appreciation actually reduces the cost of imports and increase profits.
Since firms face financial constraint, the amount of borrowing depends on profits, so
higher profits allow the firms to borrow more and invest more in R%D. Hence the pro-
ductivity will be higher with the real appreciations.
The real exchange rate and productivity
This paper does not address the relationship between the real exchange rate and the
welfare directly but provides a constructive implication regarding productivity growth.
First of all, this paper clearly illustrates the link of firms’ behavior such as the real
exchange rate, exports, imports, profits, borrowing, R&D, and productivity. The firm-
level evidence regarding technological innovation and trade is often presented as a study
limited to one country or one region(Aw et al(2011), Aghion at el(2012), and Bloom at
el(2016)).9 With the vast amount of data at the firm-level in various regions, this paper
presents a new perspective that is the main point of this study.
The three regions are classified by geography but this paper also points out the
export- and import- intensity of those regions. This is the critical factor that induces
812.5% of the real depreciation leads up to 2% of the growth of revenue TFP.
9Aw Roberts and Xu (2011) studies Taiwanese electronics industry. Aghion, Askenazy, Berman,
Cette, and Eymard (2012) use French firm-level data. Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) research
technical improvement of twelve European countries respond to competition with China.
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the main results. The emerging Asian countries are expressed by export-intensive coun-
tries, which is supported by various studies (De Melo(1985), Stubbs (1999), Kaplinsky
and Morris (2008), Terjesen and Hessels (2009).) Asian four tigers (Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and South Korea) are well known as export-oriented countries. Also, China
is a prominent example. Latin American and Eastern European countries are charac-
terized by import-intensive countries. According to Seker (2010), the eastern European
and central Asian countries display higher import intensity compared to export inten-
sity. By comparing those three regions, this paper explicitly explains the effects of the
real exchange rate.
In addition to the empirical evidence, the theoretical framework is also built in this
paper. This helps quantify the impact of the real exchange rate and analyze the mecha-
nism logically. Thus, the impact of the real exchange rate can be divided into the import
part, demand part, and physical TFP part and it helps us to compare the magnitude
clearly.
Inclusion of global crisis
To check the robustness the authors ran two regression: including and excluding global
crisis period. The result is somewhat inconsistent for other emerging countries. The
negative TFP growth is less significant (TFP computed from value-added) and no signif-
icant (TFP computed from the gross output) when excluding the years of global crisis.
This can be rationalized by adding the financial crisis in the model. The financial
constraint is expressed as follow.
fixed cost for innovation ≤ θΠi,t (1.8)
Where θ ∈ [1, θ¯] is quality of the financial system. Then the smaller θ can be inter-
preted as a tighter constraint. We can think when a financial crisis hits the economy,
θ becomes lower. Then, emerging countries suffer from real depreciations more. There
are two channels: profits and θ. The real depreciations increase imported intermediate
prices which are a large portion of the economy, so the profits will be smaller. Moreover,
due to smaller θ, all firms can borrow much smaller amount during the financial crisis,
16
and this amplifies the negative growth of TFP.
This result is consistent with the two regressions. When including financial crisis,
this amplification of negative TFP growth makes more significant and large effects of
the real depreciation. In this regard, changing θ can explain some part of the empirical
evidence.
Also, emerging Asian countries experienced a financial crisis twice: 1997 and 2008.
The debt denomination can vary over time. Then, by comparing two crises, it can
be possible to investigate the effects of debt denomination. In the benchmark analy-
sis, debts are denominated in the local currency, but when debts are denominated in
foreign currency, the debt burden is also affected by the change in the real exchange rate.
Externalities and export- and import- intensity
This model abstract from externalities often mentioned in the studies regarding tech-
nological innovation (Tylar(1981), Feder(1983), Grossman and Helpman (1991)). Their
main argument is the there is a technological spillover from more advanced country to
a less developed country when they trade. The import externalities can be larger when
the country import more various imported capital goods and the export externalities
can be derived by investing in R&D to compete with foreign firms or adopting higher
technologies from trade partners.
These externalities may explain why some countries are export-intensive and some
are import-intensive. This intensity is the crucial point of this paper but this paper does
not deal with this issue. If we measure export externalities and import externalities in
different regions, it can be concluded that emerging Asian countries are export-intensive
since they have higher export externalities while Eastern European countries have higher
import externalities. Then it can rationalize the export- and import-intensity in differ-
ent regions.
When the externalities are introduced, a new channel is added to the effects of the
change in the real exchange rate. Consider the real depreciation in emerging Asian
countries and assume that these countries experience higher export externalities. Then
the real depreciations stimulate exports and this increase profits which let the firms
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invest in R&D more and the TFP grows faster. Also, more exports induce higher exter-
nalities which increase TFP. Combining two effects, the effects of the real depreciation
can be larger.
Chapter 2
Growth, export externalities and
accumulation of foreign reserves
2.1 Introduction
The accumulation of foreign reserves is a prevalent phenomenon in developing countries.
Figure 2.1 shows the quartile of foreign reserves to GDP ratio. About half of the sample
countries have foreign reserves that exceed 15% of GDP in the early 2000s. Considering
that the average size of foreign reserves in 1980 was only 5% of GDP, this is a remarkable
growth. A sizable literature offers different arguments for the accumulation of foreign
reserves in developing countries, one of them being manipulation of terms of trade (real
exchange rate).
Accumulation of foreign reserves can be used to make the real exchange rate de-
preciate, which is suggested by Benigno and Fornaro (2012). In their paper, economic
growth is stimulated by importing intermediate inputs from abroad since they can take
advantage of technological spillovers through imports. In this case, the government has
an incentive to accumulate foreign reserves to induce real exchange rate depreciation.
This leads to higher imports of intermediate goods and thus faster economic growth can
be achieved. In this paper, I adopt their framework and incorporate export externalities
instead of import externalities. Hence, the government considers faster growth through
exports and thus has an incentive to hold foreign reserves to generate terms of trade
deterioration to boost exports. As a result, the economy exports more and experiences
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faster growth. This model can provide the justification of the behavior of the Asian
Tigers (Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) and China. They are well
known for experiencing rapid economic growth using export expansion strategies and
also have been holding a significant amount of foreign reserves.
However, there are counter-arguments regarding terms of trade policies: optimal
tariff theory and consumption smoothing motivation. The optimal tariff theory has
been developed in different ways (Kaldor (1940), Johnson (1953), Hamilton and Whalley
(1983), Kennan and Riezman (1988), Helpman and Krugman (1989), and Syropoulos
(2002)) since Bickerdike (1906). The main argument starts with governments facing
monopoly/monopsony power. They have an incentive to impose tariffs which induces
better terms of trade and increases their welfare at the cost of other countries’ welfare. In
these models, the optimal tariff level is strategically chosen to achieve the highest welfare
of the home country. Also, consumption smoothing motivation in the growth model of a
small open economy implies the improvement of terms of trade. Expecting higher income
tomorrow, agents would borrow from abroad today to smooth their consumption over
time. This is equivalent to the situation that households consume more imported goods
with better terms of trade. As a result, the economy would benefit from consumption
smoothing.
Considering these two forces related to the terms of trade, I build a model that
can analyze which effect is dominant. I put the optimal tariff policy and consumption
smoothing motivation together as a force of improvement of the terms of trade. Since
price policy instruments such as tariffs or subsidies may be forbidden by the WTO
or conflict with other trade agreements, I limit the policy tool for the management of
the terms of trade to foreign reserves, which is not against these trade rules. In other
words, when an economy accumulates foreign reserves, this means that the government
buys foreign bonds, which are external savings. In this situation, the terms of trade
are worse. On the contrary, the government can sell foreign bonds, which is external
borrowing. This accumulating foreign reserves improves the terms of trade. This re-
sult is equivalent to the effects of the combination of the optimal tariff policy and the
consumption smoothing motivation. Therefore, two forces can be expressed in terms of
foreign reserves. By using them, I can build a model suggesting answers to the question
why some countries accumulate foreign reserves while some do not.
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To address this question, this paper proposes an endogenous growth model of a small
open economy with technology spillovers through exports. There are two goods in this
economy: domestic and foreign goods. The domestic goods are tradable, and thus can
be exported or consumed domestically. The main feature of this model is the export
externalities. The definition of export externalities in the paper is the spillover effects of
exports on productivity growth. This can be achieved in two channels. First, to export
domestic goods, the firms are exposed to more intense competition in the foreign market,
which allows the firms to access a wide range of technology improvements through their
activities in the foreign market.(De Melo (1985)) Furthermore, there is a case where
knowledge can flow from international buyers and competitors. They normally advise
how to improve efficiency and reduce costs.(Blalock and Gertler (2004)) These techno-
logical innovations are accumulated as a form of knowledge. Higher knowledge implies
higher productivity when producing domestic goods. Due to the export externalities
the economy can grow faster as it exports more.
This paper shows how governments in exporting countries use foreign reserves to
increase their welfare. The optimal decisions depend on the magnitude of export exter-
nalities. If the export externalities are large enough, then the government accumulates
foreign reserves to achieve faster economic growth. In the model, private agents fail to
internalize the export externalities. Therefore, they export less than the socially optimal
amount and the economy grows more slowly without the government intervention. On
the other hand, the government takes externalities into account, and increases foreign
reserves to encourage the private sectors to export more. The key assumption here is
that the foreign reserves are denominated in foreign goods. Thus, the accumulation
decision for the foreign reserves can change the terms of trade.1 Increasing foreign re-
serves makes the domestic goods relatively cheaper so the domestic country can export
more compared to the case where the government does not intervene. As a result, the
economy experiences faster growth with technological spillovers through higher exports.
I compare the dynamics of several important variables in two different equilibria: the
competitive equilibrium and the benevolent government equilibrium. In the competitive
equilibrium (CE), consumers are not allowed to save and borrow. Also, since there is
1The terms of trade is defined as the price for imports over the price for exports. In this model, the
terms of trade are equal to the real exchange rate since imported goods are foreign goods and exported
goods are domestic goods.
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no government, the foreign reserves are zero over time. However, in the benevolent
government equilibrium (BGE), the government increases foreign reserves because it
internalizes the faster growth achieved by export externalities. Therefore, the terms of
trade in the BGE are higher than the one in the CE. This induces more exports, so the
optimal consumption is less than the one in the CE for the first few periods. However,
because the economic growth is faster, the consumption catches up to the one in the
CE, and eventually goes beyond. As a result, the welfare under government intervention
is higher than the one in the CE. This illustrates the inter-temporal trade-off from the
foreign reserves. The increase in the foreign reserves would lead to less consumption
today but more consumption in the future by speeding up growth. Once the economy
reaches a steady-state, it no longer needs technological innovation through exports, so
the government simply maintains enough foreign reserves to stay in the steady-state.
This is the situation where the accumulation of foreign reserves improves welfare.
Nevertheless, it is not always optimal to choose to hold positive foreign reserves. To
examine this, I vary the magnitude of export externalities and find that the government
would borrow when externalities are positive but small. This is because the optimal
foreign reserves are determined by comparing the benefits from faster growth through
exports and the benefits from smoothing consumption and better terms of trade. If
export externalities are large enough, the former effects outweigh the latter one, so the
government sacrifices today’s consumption to achieve faster growth by accumulating
the foreign reserves. Consequently, the terms of trade deteriorate. However, when
externalities are small, the latter force is stronger than the former one, so the government
borrows to consume more today, which induces better terms of trade. This impedes the
growth of the economy, but the economy gains welfare from the benefits of consumption
smoothing and cheaper imported goods.
Literature review This paper is related to several branches of literature. First,
there are papers about growth associated with knowledge spillovers through interna-
tional trade. The theoretical study of cross-country knowledge spillovers was established
by Grossman and Helpman (1991). They build an endogenous growth model of a small
open economy and incorporate knowledge flow from abroad through international trade.
22
Since knowledge is non-rivalrous and non-excludable, it is hard to extract compensa-
tion from all agents who use it. This is how knowledge brings spillover benefits while
trading. The authors argue that trade can affect growth in the long run through this
mechanism. There is also a sizable literature studying knowledge flow across countries
and they show knowledge transmission can be done through either importing foreign
products or exporting to foreign markets. I focus on the latter channel in this paper as
this channel is supported by other empirical papers.
The current literature provides empirical support for the export promotion policies
achieving economic growth. Balassa (1978) and Balassa (1985) show that GDP growth
is significantly affected by exports with eleven industrial countries. Tyler (1981) extends
this argument to 55 middle income developing countries. He incorporates exports as
an input of production function because export externalities may help more efficient
production. Feder (1983) first develops a two-sector model with export and non-export
sectors and estimate externalities based on the different marginal factor productivity
between two sectors. This model indicates that the export sector has higher productivity
that leads to the growth of the economy by reallocating resources from the non-export
sector to the export sector. Bilginsoy and Khan (1994) improve Feder’s specification by
relaxing some assumptions and measuring the export externalities.2 All these papers
empirically show the positive correlation between economic growth and exports. The
externalities are generally mentioned with efficiency from competitive management, the
introduction of advanced techniques, training of higher quality labor, or economies of
scale3. In this paper, I develop a theory of knowledge externalities through exports,
which is consistent with the key results documented in the empirical literature.
There have been huge studies on foreign reserves. One explanation is that the
accumulation of foreign reserves is a result of the precautionary motive. Developing
economies are concerned about the situation of limited access to international financial
markets. Therefore, they have the purpose of self-insurance. (Ranciere and Jeanne
(2006), Aizenman and Lee (2007), Caballero and Panageas (2007), Alfro and Kanczuk
2Bilginsoy and Khan (1994) allow inter-sectoral externality and constant term in their regression
and chose non-export sector growth as the dependent variable to avoid spurious correlation problem.
3chipman(1970), Helpman and Krugman(1985), and Romer(1986) use the increasing returns to
express economies of scale.
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(2009), Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez (2016), and Hur and Kondo(2016)). Mean-
while, there is another factor that accounts for a significant amount of foreign reserves:
acceleration of growth. Benigno and Fornaro (2012) build an endogenous growth model
with knowledge spillovers through intermediate inputs and show how foreign reserves
can increase imports of the inputs. They argue that by increasing foreign reserves, a real
exchange rate is depreciated, and this leads to high intermediate inputs. In addition,
it also makes labor reallocate to tradable sectors, so the economy grows faster. This
paper focuses more on imports while Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2005) are
interested in exports. They mention that high foreign reserves are a part of strategies to
boost the nation’s growth by keeping the foreign exchange rate undervalued. It seems
to be a rational claim when we see countries like China and South Korea since their
export-oriented growth strategy is widely known as their growth engine. As opposed
to these papers, I build an endogenous growth model of a small open economy with
knowledge flow through exporting to foreign markets.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes empirical evidence on foreign
reserves, exports, and growth in developing economies; Section 3 presents a baseline
model and defines equilibria with and without a benevolent government to examine the
role of the foreign reserve; Section 4 shows quantitative analysis to compare welfares; I
then conclude in Section 5.
2.2 Data and empirical findings
This section describes definitions of main variables and documents a set of key findings.
The data set contains annual data of 50 developing countries from 1980 to 2016. These
countries were considered developing countries in 1995 according to the World Bank
(1995) but are now classified as developed countries.4 Since the paper analyzes the
dynamics of growth, these countries, that used to be developing countries, are included
4World Bank classifies developing countries by low-income, middle-income, and transition countries.
South Korea, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Latvia, and Lithuania are now listed as high-
income countries in World Bank (Fantom and Serajuddin (2016)
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Figure 2.1: Quartile of foreign reserves to GDP
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Notes: The dot-dash line presents the 3rd quartile (75 percentile) of the 50 sample countries. The
gray solid line and the black dot lines are the median quartile (50 percentile) and the 1st quartile (25
percentile) of the sample respectively.
in the data set. I divide the sample countries into two types of countries: countries fol-
lowing a policy of export growth and countries without this policy. Detailed definitions
will be explained in the next section.
Using the data, I document the following facts.
1. Export-oriented countries have been accumulating foreign reserves more than non
export-oriented countries.
2. Export-oriented countries show more of a significant positive correlation between
growth rate and foreign reserves than others.
Before illustrating these facts, county growth policies are defined in the next section.
2.2.1 Export-oriented countries
Export-oriented countries are considered countries that have experienced a high growth
rate of the exports-to-GDP ratio since 1980.5 I assume that the countries who grow due
5Exports-to-GDP ratio can be used to define the export-oriented economy, but some developing
countries are small in terms of size of GDP. Thus, even though the absolute value of exports is very
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to the export externalities increase exports more compared to their economic size, so
the exports-to-GDP ratio shows an increasing trend. To capture this feature, I take the
average of the exports-to-GDP ratio from 1980 to 1990 and also one from 2006 to 2016
and calculate the growth rate using the two values. The reason for taking the average
for 10 years is to obtain the general level of the ratio in the beginning and end of the
sample period.6 Finally, the export-oriented countries are classified by the following
equation.
g
(
Exports
GDP
)
1980−2016
> 0.51
Countries that grew more than 51% in the exports-to-GDP ratio compared to 1980s are
classified as an export-oriented country. By this criterion 0.51 is at the 60th percentile
in the sample. In other words, the top 40% of countries in terms of their growth rate
are classified in this group. According to this definition, 19 countries are included in
the export-growth policy countries.7
I also define non export-oriented countries as a comparative group to the export-
growth policy countries. I assume that these countries tend not to increase their exports-
to-GDP ratio because exports are not critical to growth. As a result, the criteria value
is set to be 0.26, which is at the 40th percentile in the sample. In other words, the
countries whose growth of exports-to-GPD ratio is less than 26% during the sample
period are classified as non export-growth policy countries. The list of countries in the
two groups is shown in the Appendix(A.1).
Table 2.1 presents the mean values for main variables related to exports, GDP, and
foreign reserves. The first three variables (ExportsGDP ,
Foreign Reserves
GDP , g(GDP) ) are the
simple average over the sample period, from 1980 to 2016 and each column shows the
small, they could be included as a country with an export-growth policy. Also, China and Korea, which
are well-known as the countries that follow a policy of export growth, are excluded with this definition.
For this reason, I use the growth rate of exports-to-GDP ratio.
6when a specific year is picked the general exports-to-GDP ratio might be misled if the country
is hit by shocks. For example, the exports-to-GDP ratio of Argentina in 2001 picked up to 26% from
10%, but this occurred because the GDP dropped dramatically due to the economic crisis in 2001, not
because of increase in exports.
7The median of the growth of the export-to-GDP ratio is 0.44.
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Table 2.1: Mean values for the main variables
All countries Export-oriented Non export-oriented
Exports/GDP 29.5% 28.7% 26.3%
Foreign reserves/GDP 11.1% 11.6% 9.0%
g(GDP) 2.1% 3% 1.2%
g(Exports/GDP) 65% 140% 2%
g(Foreign reserves/GDP) 5.1% 6.0% 4.5%
Notes: g(·) means the growth rate of a variable. Exports/GDP, Foreign reserves/GDP, and g(GDP)
are the mean of each variable from 1980 to 2016. To obtain the mean value of the growth rate of
exports-to-GDP ratio for each country I calculated two values for the exports-to-GDP ratio: one for
the first 10 years and one for the last 10 year of the sample period. Then I obtained the growth rate
using the two values. The number shown in each column is the mean value in each group. The mean
values of the growth rate of the foreign reserves-to-GDP ratio are also calculated in the same way.
mean of countries in each group : all countries, export-growth policy, and non export-
growth policy countries. The growth of export- and foreign reserves-to-GDP ratios are
calculated according to the steps described above.
First of all, it is clear from this Table 2.1 that mean values of the exports-to-GDP and
the foreign reserves-to-GDP ratios do not show significant differences in the mean of all
countries. The average level of the exports-to-GDP ratio is even higher for all countries.
Thus, some countries that are not included in the export-oriented countries have higher
exports. The export-oriented countries export more than non export-oriented countries.
The foreign reserves-to-GDP ratio shows the same pattern. The foreign reserves-to-GDP
ratio of all countries and export-oriented countries are quite similar while they have a
bit higher level of foreign reserves than non export-oriented countries.
However, the average growth rates are different in the three groups. The growth rate
of exports-to-GDP ratio is remarkably higher in the export-oriented countries. This is a
natural result due to the definitions for the export-oriented countries. They grew more
than 140 percent during the sample period while the non export-oriented countries only
grew 2 percent. The mean for all countries is 65 percent. Also, countries following the
export growth policy grew faster on average. This is consistent with the features of
export-oriented countries. If the export-oriented countries grow through exports, high
exports imply high growth of the economy. Furthermore, those countries show the high
growth of foreign reserves as well. This supports the main argument of this paper. As
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foreign reserves increase, countries export more, meaning higher growth of exports, and
those countries grow faster. This is also related to the first empirical finding that I will
document in the next section.
2.2.2 Foreign reserves and Exports
As shown in Table 2.1, the level of foreign reserves-to-GDP ratio in the export-oriented
countries is higher than other countries. It is also worthwhile to see how foreign reserves
change over time in two groups. If exports increase as foreign reserves are accumulated,
then it can be concluded that the export-oriented countries accumulate foreign reserves
faster than the non export-oriented countries. This fact is depicted in Figure 2.2. The
gray solid line is the mean of the foreign reserves-to-GDP ratio of export-oriented coun-
tries and the black dash line is that of non export-oriented countries.
According to the first graph (a), The foreign reserves accounted for only around
5% in GDP in 1980 and they showed a fairly similar pattern until 1995. During this
period, the non export-oriented countries had even higher foreign reserves. Starting
in 1995, the export-oriented countries began to overtake the group of other countries
and kept increasing and reached over 20% right before 2007. This continuous growth
of the foreign reserves suggests this importance as a policy in those countries. This is
consistent with the idea that the countries that have export-led growth strategies can
export more with higher foreign reserves. This argument is also supported by the graph
(b). The increasing pattern of exports is quite similar to the foreign reserves in these
countries. Both rose until the global crisis and decreased after 2010.
On the other hand, the average ratio in the non export-oriented countries is quite
constant in the 1990s. It started increasing in the mid-2000s but failed to catch up to the
foreign reserves-to-GDP in the countries with the export growth policy. Furthermore,
there is no correlation between the foreign reserves-to-GDP ratio and exports-to-GDP
ratio in these countries. While the foreign reserves exhibit a rising pattern, the exports
are constant and the movement after 2005 even exhibits a decreasing pattern. From
Figure 2.2, it can be concluded that the export-oriented countries have a higher level of
foreign reserves, and the growth of the foreign reserves are faster.
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(a) Foreign reserves-to-GPD ratio
(b) Exports-to-GPD ratio
Notes: The gray solid line presents the mean of 19 countries following the export growth policy and the
black dash line represents the mean of 18 countries without that policy.
Figure 2.2: Share of GDP from 1980 to 2016
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2.2.3 Foreign reserves and Growth
(a) Countries with the export-growth policy
(b) Countries without the export-growth
Notes: Each plot shows the average value of annual growth rate and foreign reserves-to-GDP ratio of
each country during the sample period.
Figure 2.3: Growth rate and Foreign reserves-to-GDP ratio
30
In addition to exports, economic growth also shows a positive relationship with
foreign reserves in the export-oriented countries. Table 2.1 show that the export-oriented
group has a higher growth rate of GDP per capita and also higher foreign reserves-to-
GDP ratio compared to the other group of countries. Figure 2.3 provides a more detailed
analysis of this fact using scatter plots. Plots (a) and (b) illustrate the relationship of
annual growth rate and foreign reserves-to-GDP ratio in the export-oriented countries
and non export-oriented countries respectively.
Countries having high foreign reserves experience faster growth if the countries are
classified as an export-oriented country. The correlation coefficient is 0.56, indicating a
significant positive correlation.8 China displays the highest annual growth rate among
those countries and is well-known as having export-led growth strategies. Furthermore,
China has the most foreign reserves and it recorded 4 trillion dollars in 2014. This
example supports the claim that high growth comes with high foreign reserves if the
country follows the export growth policy. On the other hand, it is hard to say that
there is a relationship between growth rate and foreign reserves-to-GDP ratio among
the countries without the policy. Also, the correlation coefficient is 0.05, hardly different
from 0.
Additionally, even though the export-oriented countries tend to hoard higher foreign
reserves compared to the other country group, the ranges are quite similar, spanning
from 0 to 25 if Bhutan is excluded. However, the range of annual growth rate is no-
ticeably different. No country in Figure 2.3 (a) records a negative growth rate and
some countries such as China, Korea, Vietnam, India, and Thailand experienced high
growth– more than 4% – from 1980. Their foreign reserves-to-GDP ratios lie between
15% to 25%. Meanwhile, the growth rates of non export-oriented countries within this
range are less than 2%. Given the fact that a 1% difference in annual growth rate can
bring incredible differences over 37 years, the gap between the growth rates of the two
groups is non-negligible. This indicates that foreign reserves are not correlated with the
growth rate in the non export-oriented countries, but the export-oriented countries, in
fact, cannot ignore the effects of foreign reserves. They reap the benefits from the high
foreign reserves.
8Bhutan seems to be an extreme case but eliminating it will not change the positive correlation.
Without Bhutan, the correlation coefficient is 0.62, which is higher than with it.
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I have currently supported two claims regarding foreign reserves, exports, and growth.
The following section discusses a model and assumptions in detail and describes the
modeling elements required to describe the empirical results of the previous section.
2.3 Model
In this section, I develop an endogenous growth model of an almost small open economy
(SOE) in the presence of export externalities. There are a home and a foreign country
and produces domestic goods and foreign goods respectively. The domestic goods are
either consumed in the home country or exported to the foreign country. Similar to
Benigno and Fornaro (2012), the knowledge spillovers take place through exports.9 In
this way, the home country accumulates the knowledge stock that induces economic
growth.
The domestic goods are exported goods and foreign goods are imported goods so
the relative price between foreign goods and domestic goods is defined as the terms
of trade. The export price is normalized to one so that terms of trade are effectively
expressed in units of foreign goods.
This model is almost a small open economy in the sense that the interest rate of the
foreign reserves and the foreign country’s output are exogenously given. More precisely,
the home country can affect the terms of trade, but not foreign income so this model
is different from a small open economy. Also, the foreign country has a deep pocket, so
the interest rate of the foreign reserves is the risk-free rate since it never defaults.
In this world, time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, · · · ,∞. In the home country,
there are three agents: the representative consumer, the representative firm, and the
government. The consumer chooses how many domestic and foreign goods to consume.
The firm produces domestic goods given the knowledge stock and sells them to the
domestic consumer or exports them to the foreign country. Lastly, the government
chooses how much to save (or borrow) in the foreign country. I call this external saving
9Benigno and Fornaro (2012) explain the knowledge accumulation with imports. By importing
foreign capital goods, firms in developing countries can benefit from the spillover effects of discovery
from developed countries.
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as foreign reserves and this is the only policy tool of the government in this economy.
To see its role, I will propose two equilibria: the competitive equilibrium without the
government and the equilibrium of the benevolent government problem.
2.3.1 Consumers
The consumers in this economy are infinitely lived and all identical. The representative
consumer owns a domestic firm. She consumes a composite good of the domestic and
the foreign goods. The preference is given by:
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
]
(2.1)
where β is the discount factor and the utility function u(·) is the Constant-Relative-
Risk-Aversion (CRRA), which has the functional form of u(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ where σ is a risk
aversion parameter. The composite good Ct is an Armington-type of CES aggregator
with elasticity of substitution 1/(1−η) between domestic goods cD and imported foreign
goods cF
ct = c(c
D
t , c
F
t ) =
[
ω(cDt )
−η + (1− ω)(cFt )−η
]− 1
η (2.2)
where 0 < ω < 1 denotes the share of expenditure on the domestic tradable goods. The
income sources of the consumer are wages wt, profits from the firm pit, and transfers
from the government Tt. The total income is used to consume domestic goods and
foreign goods. Hence, the budget constraint is followed by:
cDt + ptc
F
t = wtLt + pit + ptTt (2.3)
where pt is terms of trade. I assume inelastic labor supply, so Lt = 1 for all t. The
representative consumer receives transfers in terms of foreign goods since the government
saves foreign reserves in the foreign country and they are denominated in foreign goods.
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2.3.2 Firms
There is a large number of firms in this economy. Since all firms are identical I analyze
the representative firm. The representative firm produces domestic goods that can
be consumed domestically or exported. The firm produces using labor Lt, and the
knowledge stock γt that shows the level of productivity in the economy. The production
function has the following form:
Yt = (γtLt)
α (2.4)
The Yt is the output of the domestic goods and α is labor share with 0 < α < 1.
The produced goods are sold in the domestic market and exported: Yt = q
d
t + xt
where qdt is domestic demand and xt is foreign demand. The foreign demand function
for the domestic goods in the almost small economy depends on the terms of trade and
outputs in the foreign country Y ? which is exogenously given.10
xt =
(
1
pt
)−φ
Y ? (2.5)
where φ > 0. −φ is the elasticity of demand for domestic tradable goods.
As a result, the firm’s profit function is expressed as:
pit = (γtLt)
α − wtLt (2.6)
2.3.3 The Knowledge accumulation
The firm produces domestic goods given the available knowledge stock. I assume that
the foreign country is more advanced, and the knowledge stock is non-rivalrous and
non-excludable. These assumptions enable the knowledge spillovers from the foreign
country to the home country. This knowledge spillover can be achieved by exports.
10This demand function is standard in small open economy models and the function depends on
export price px and world price P ? as follow: xt =
(
pxt
P?t
)−φ
Y ? In this paper, I use import price as the
world price so
pxt
P?t
= 1
pt
and the demand function is obtained
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By exporting, the home country adopts new technologies and ideas made in the foreign
country and the knowledge can be accumulated in this process. This feature is captured
in the law of motion of the knowledge stock:
γt+1 = ψγt + x
ζx
t γ
ζγ
t (2.7)
where ψ ≥ 0 and ζx + ζγ ≤ 1. γt is the knowledge stock in period t and ψ shows the
persistency of the knowledge stock. ζx presents the share of knowledge that exports
contribute so ζx = 0 means no export externalities.
I assume that the externality function in the knowledge accumulation equation
presents decreasing returns to scale, i.e., ζx + ζγ ≤ 1. This assumption ensures that
the optimal level of foreign reserves is finite.11
2.3.4 The Government
The government trades foreign reserves and gives transfers to the consumer in this
economy. The foreign reserves are one-period risk-free bonds issued by the foreign
country. The interest rate of the foreign reserves is Rf . At time t, the government in
the home country receives returns on the foreign reserves that were accumulated in the
previous period RFAt, chooses the level of foreign reserves At+1, and gives transfers to
the consumers in a lump sum fashion Tt. The government budget constraint is given as:
Tt = RfAt −At+1 (2.8)
11Suppose knowledge accumulation equation shows constant returns to scale, i.e., ζx + ζγ = 1.
Consider the law of motion of the knowledge stock in the steady-state. Then (1− ψ)γ∗1−ζγ = x∗ζx
35
2.4 Equilibrium
2.4.1 Competitive equilibrium without the government
In this section, consider the situation where there is no government in this economy.
Thus, the foreign reserves and transfers are set to be zero every period t ≥ 0. Substi-
tuting Tt = 0 into (2.3), the consumer’s budget constraint becomes
cDt + ptc
F
t = wtLt + pit (2.9)
The consumer chooses consumption bundles {cDt , cFt }t≥0 to maximize the expected
value of utility (2.1) subject to (2.9), taking the terms of trade and wage, and prof-
its {pt, wt, pit}t≥0 as given. The consumer’s optimality condition is:
pt =
u2(c
D
t , c
F
t )
u1(cDt , c
F
t )
(2.10)
ui(c
D
t , c
F
t ) means a partial derivative of the utility function with respect to the ith
argument at time t. The equation (2.10) indicates that the terms of trade (relative
price) equals the marginal rate of substitution of the foreign and the domestic goods.
In the firm’s problem, the firm chooses {Yt, Lt, qdt , xt, pit}t≥0 given the terms of trade
{pt}t≥0 and the knowledge stock {γt}t≥0. As mentioned in the previous section, there
is a large number of firms, so each firm is too small to internalize the effects of export
externalities. Therefore, the firm takes the knowledge stock as given every period.
Therefore, the firm’s problem is not a maximization problem. Given the knowledge
stock and inelastic labor supply, the output of the domestic goods is determined, and
the level of exports is determined by the terms of trade in the foreign demand function
for the domestic goods. Consequently, the amount of domestically consumed goods and
the profits are automatically determined. The first-order condition of the firm is only
for the labor demanded:
wt = αγt(γtLt)
(α−1) (2.11)
The optimality condition (2.11) equates wage and the marginal product of labor.
Market clearing condition for domestic goods market should equate the output to
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the amount of the domestic goods consumed in the home and the foreign country. Since
consumers are identical, the market clearing condition is:
cDt + xt = Yt (2.12)
Notice that the domestic goods that are consumed in the home are equal to those pro-
duced for the domestic market, so the market clearing condition (2.12) already reflected
cTt = q
d
t . Combining (2.12) with the consumer’s budget constraint (2.9) and the firm’s
profits function (2.6), the trade balance is obtained as :
xt − ptcFt = 0 (2.13)
There is no external savings and borrowing in this equilibrium, so this economy al-
ways shows trade balance. Using the optimality conditions and the market-clearing
conditions, the competitive equilibrium can be defined
Definition 1. Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium for the almost small open economy is defined by a set of the
representative consumer’s allocations {cDt , cFt }t≥0, the representative firm’s allocations
{Yt, Lt, qdt , xt, pit}t≥0, the terms of trade and the wages {pt, wt}t≥0, and the stock of
knowledge {γt+1}t≥0, given initial knowledge stock and foreign output {γ0, Y ?} such
that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Consumer: Given {pt, wt, pit}t≥0, the consumer’s allocations {cDt , cFt }t≥0 satisfy
the optimality condition (2.10).
2. Firm: Given {pt, wt, γt, Y ?, z}t≥0, the firm chooses {Yt, Lt, qdt , xt, pit}t≥0 satisfying
(2.4), (2.5), (2.6), and (2.11).
3. The market for domestic goods clears as (2.12) and trade balance satisfies (2.13).
4. The knowledge stock evolves according to (2.7).
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2.4.2 The Benevolent Government
In the previous section, the competitive equilibrium without the government was de-
scribed. Now, consider the economy where the government can intervene in the market.
The government in this economy is called as the benevolent government since it maxi-
mizes the consumer’s utility knowing all the optimality decisions of the private agents.
The government makes a foreign reserves decision which is not allowed to the private
agents and pays (or collects) transfers (taxes) to the consumer in a lump-sum fashion.
Then, the consumers choose their consumption bundles of domestic and foreign goods
in a competitive way. Thus, the consumer’s budget constraint in this benevolent gov-
ernment problem is the equation (2.3) including transfers Tt. Also, the trade balance
should be different from that with no government case. Combining the government
budget constraint (2.8) with the consumer’s budget constraint (2.3), the trade balance
is expressed as:
xt − ptcFt = pt (At+1 −RfAt) (2.14)
One important feature of the government is that it can internalize the impact of
growth through exports. This aspect is a significant difference from the private agents
in this model. The government knows that choosing a higher level of foreign reserves
deteriorates the terms of trade and it is advantageous for high exports. Since high
exports contributes to the faster accumulation of knowledge, the home country can
experience faster growth by hoarding foreign reserves.
Now consider the optimization problem of the benevolent government in a recursive
form. The state variables are the current foreign reserves holding A, and the knowledge
stocks γ. The crucial state variable is the later one. Since the representative private
agents can not internalize the export externalities, the competitive equilibrium is solved
without taking account of the dynamic process of knowledge accumulation involving
the export externalities. However, the benevolent government takes into account it, so
takes the knowledge stocks as a state variable. Combining the budget constraint (2.3)
and (2.14), the resource constraint for the tradable good can be expressed as
cDt + xt = (γtLt)
α (2.15)
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The benevolent government optimization problem consists of maximizing the value of
consumer’s life time utility (2.1) subject to the resource constraint for the tradable goods
(2.15), the trade balance (2.14), the consumer’s optimality condition (2.10), the foreign
demand function for the domestic goods (2.5), and the law of motion of the knowledge
stock (2.7). The government’s recursive optimization problem can be expressed as
following:
V (A, γ) = Max
cD,cF ,c,x,A′
{u(c(cD, cF )) + βV (A′, γ′)} (2.16)
s.t cD + x = (γL)α
x− pcF = p (A′ −RfA)
x =
(
1
p
)−φ
Y ?
γ′ = ψγ + (x)ζx(γ)ζγ
p =
1− ω
ω
(
cD
cF
)1+η
Where u(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ and c(c
D, cF ) =
[
ω(cD)−η + (1− ω)(cF )−η]− 1η . The notation for
the variable with the prime superscript means variable in the next period. As shown
in the problem the government knows the optimal actions of the private agents, and
chooses an optimal allocation of consumption cˆD(A, γ), cˆF (A, γ), exports xˆ(A, γ), and
foreign reserves Aˆ′(A, γ) to maximize the consumer’s utility.
Definition 2. Recursive Equilibrium
The recursive equilibrium for the benevolent government is defined by a pricing function
pˆ(A, γ), and a decision rule Aˆ′(A, γ) for the benevolent government with associated value
function V (A, γ), consumption and exports rules {cˆD(A, γ), cˆF (A, γ)}, xˆ(A, γ), and a
knowledge stock rule ˆgamma(A, γ) such that the following conditions hold:
1. Given pˆ(A, γ), the decision rule Aˆ′(A, γ) solves the benevolent government recur-
sive maximization problem (2.16) and the exports policy xˆ(A, γ) satisfies (2.5).
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2. Given pˆ(A, γ), the tradable consumption plan cˆD(A, γ) satisfies the resource con-
straint (2.15) of the economy and the imported goods consumption plan cˆF (A, γ)
satisfies the trade balance (2.14).
3. The knowledge stock γˆ(A, γ) evolves according to (2.7).
2.4.3 Export Externalities and Efficiency
In the previous sections, I described the competitive equilibrium without the government
and the recursive equilibrium of the benevolent government problem. Since the private
agents cannot internalize the export externalities, the competitive equilibrium without
the government cannot achieve the first best. However, the government can take into
account the externalities, thus it will use its policy tool to make the private agents
achieve the second best. I illustrate how externalities are considered in the government
problem.
Consider the first order condition (A.8) for the benevolent government. Appendix
(A.2) provides full parts of the characterization of the benevolent government allocation.
This equation shows the crucial difference between the equilibrium solved by the benev-
olent government and that of the competitive equilibrium. The sequential notation is
used to compare two equilibria.
pt =
u2(c
D
t , c
F
t )
u1(cDt , c
F
t )
(
1−Ψt
(
p
−φ(1−ζx)
t
)) (2.17)
where Ψt = αζx (γt)
ζγ
(
u1(cDt+1,c
F
t+1)
u1(cDt ,c
F
t )
(
Yt+1
γt+1
))
> 0.
To analyze this equation, consider two extreme cases: ζx = 0 or ζx = 1. ζx = 1
cannot be realized in this economy due to the assumption of ζγ + ζx ≤ 1. However, to
see the meaning of the equation 2.17, relax the assumption for now. ζx = 0 means there
is no export externalities. In this case, the equation (2.17) equals the corresponding
equation for the competitive equilibrium (2.10). The (2.10) equates the terms of trade
to the marginal rate of substitution. On the contrary, when ζx = 1, Ψt is always positive.
This is what the additional term that the government considers when optimizing. The
denominator on the right-hand side is divided into two terms: the marginal utility of
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consuming one unit of domestic good, u1(c
D
t , c
F
t ), and the marginal benefits of exporting
one unit of tradable good, Ψt
(
p
−φ(1−ζx)
t
)
. The first term presents the increase in the
marginal utility of the domestic goods today while the second term includes the marginal
utility tomorrow. This term represents the benefits of increased knowledge stock implied
by an additional unit of export. One more unit of export today induces higher knowledge
tomorrow, and thus more output will be produced with a higher productivity tomorrow.
As a result, the consumers will be able to consume more domestic goods tomorrow. In
other words, this term refers to growth effects from the export externalities that are not
internalized by the private agents. Furthermore, the benefits are realized in the next
period. Then, due to the market-clearing condition, the government has to choose either
to consume or to export. If the consumer decides to consume the domestic good today, it
has to give up the benefits coming from growth so the marginal utility of domestic good
is u1(c
D
t , c
F
t )
(
1−Ψt
(
p
−φ(1−ζx)
t
))
. As the export externalities, ζx increase the benefits
of exporting becomes larger so the marginal utility of domestic goods becomes smaller.
Equivalently it is a decision of the increase in utility between today and tomorrow. Since
the government internalizes the growth effects from the exports, it has an incentive to
use foreign reserves as a policy tool to stimulate exports.
To see how the government uses the foreign reserves, compare the terms of trade in
the two equilibria. Define pct and p
g
t the terms of trade under the competitive equilibrium
and benevolent government problem respectively.
pct =
u2(c
D
t , c
F
t )
u1(cDt , c
F
t )
, pgt −Ψt(pgt )1−φ(1−ζx) =
u2(c
D
t , c
F
t )
u1(cDt , c
F
t )
(2.18)
Since Ψt > 0 and p
g
t > 0, with positive export externalities the terms of trade under the
government problem are higher than that under the competitive equilibrium, pct < p
g
t
if both has the same consumption bundle. The government takes into account the
growth effects through exports, so the opportunity cost of the domestic goods becomes
higher under the government problem. In other words, consumption of one unit of
the domestic goods today means that the consumer has to give up the utility from
the consumption on the foreign goods today and also the higher consumption on the
domestic good tomorrow. Hence, the cost of consumption on the today’s domestic goods
is relatively expensive. As a result, the government wants the market to achieve pgt . The
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lower terms of trade in the competitive environment mean that too many foreign goods
are consumed. Thus, by accumulating foreign reserves in terms of foreign goods, the
government makes the consumer consume fewer foreign goods, and thus the higher terms
of trade can be obtained. This is how the government manages foreign reserves.
2.5 Quantitative Analysis
Here I study the quantitative implication of the model using a baseline calibration based
on data from Taiwan, well known as an export-oriented country hoarding sizeable for-
eign reserves. I investigate the mechanism of the model and provide a welfare analysis
over the sample period.
2.5.1 Calibration
The parameters in the model are calibrated with yearly frequency. Table 2.2 shows the
calibrated parameter values. The weight on domestic goods in utility function ω is set
by the ratio of consumption on tradable goods to total consumption on tradable goods
averaged over the sample period. Tradable goods are defined as non-service goods and
the domestic tradable consumption is obtained by subtracting import of consumption
goods from the total consumption of tradable goods.
The risk aversion parameter σ is set to 2 and the quarterly world risk-free interest
rate Rf is set to 1%, which are standard values in international macro studies. The
curvature of Armington aggregate of domestic tradable goods and imported goods η is
set to be 0.11, following the calibration of Heathcote and Perri (2002). This implies the
elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and foreign goods is 0.9. According
to Tallman and Wang (1994), Taiwan’s labor share in output α was 0.66 during the
period from 1965 to 1990. The value of elasticity of demand for exports φ is obtained
from Imbs and Mejean (2010). ω is calculated with weight on domestic tradable goods.
Finally, the constant term in the knowledge process ψ knowledge and export contri-
bution parameters, ζγ and ζx, are calibrated. First, I could obtain elasticity of knowledge
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Table 2.2: Parameters
Parameter Description Value Source/Data
β Discount factor 0.96 4% interest rate
σ Risk aversion 2.00 Standard value
ω Weight on domestic 0.64 1T
∑ Non−importcons.
Trad.cons.
tradable goods
η Amington curvature 0.11 Heathcote and Perri(2002)
α Labor share in output 0.66 Tallman and Wang (1994)
φ Elasticity of export demand 1.50 Imbs and Mejean(2010)
Rf Gross risk-free interest rate 1.01 standard value
ψ Constant in 0.10 2.1% growth rate
knowledge process of non-exporters
ζx export contribution 0.61 8.1% higher productivity
of exporters
ζγ knowledge contribution 0.18 Elasticity of knowledge
on productivity
spillovers on productivity which is 0.1812 and set it to ζγ . Taiwan has an exporting pre-
mium which means that after experiencing exporting, the growth of productivity of the
firms become faster. Controlling self-selection effects, Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000)
suggest that the productivity differential between exporters and non-exporters is 6 per-
cent from 1981 to 1991. ψ and ζx are calibrated to match 1.77% of productivity growth
of non-exporters and 6% higher productivity in the exporting sector.
2.5.2 Results
Based on this calibration, I analyze the solutions of two equilibria: the competitive
equilibrium and the equilibrium of the benevolent government. I simulate the models to
analyze the growth of knowledge, output, and consumption in the long run and Figure
2.4 shows the two equilibria. The red solid line represents the competitive equilibrium
without the government and the blue dash line displays the equilibrium of the benevolent
government’s problem. The initial foreign reserves and the initial knowledge stock is 0
12followed by Tsai and Wang (2004).
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and 0.1 respectively and I simulate for 50 periods.
I first show the simulation results from the competitive equilibrium without the
government. The private agents are not allowed to save in the foreign country and
there is no government in this equilibrium, the foreign reserves are zero all the time.
This also implies a zero trade balance. The economy exports as much as imports times
terms of trade. Given the initial knowledge stock, the economy accumulates knowledge
by exporting domestic goods. Hence, knowledge stock grows over time, and thus the
output also grows since the knowledge stock is an input factor of the production. As
output increases, the consumption of domestic and foreign goods increase. The terms
of trade are less than 1. This means domestic goods are more expensive than foreign
goods. For this reason, the consumption of domestic goods is less than the consumption
of foreign goods. Eventually, this economy converges.
On the other hand, internalizing the effects of knowledge externalities, the benevolent
government accumulates foreign reserves over time. During the first few periods, the
government saves in the foreign country very quickly, so the foreign reserves sharply
increase. Meanwhile, the government policy induces the higher terms of trade and this
enables the economy to stimulate exports. Thus, the knowledge stock increases as the
exports rise. When the knowledge converges to the steady-state value, the government
does not need to boost exports anymore. This is a consequence of decreasing returns
to scale of the externality function in the law of motion of knowledge. Larger exports
give lower marginal benefits of exporting, and thus the knowledge does not significantly
grow at a certain level of exports. Thus, after the knowledge converges, the government
attempts to keep exports as much as maintaining the steady-state level of the knowledge
stock. Therefore, the foreign reserves show overshooting during the first few periods to
boost exports but decrease to the point where can keep the steady-state value of the
knowledge stock.
The accumulation of the foreign reserves results in the lower consumption of both
goods compared to the competitive equilibrium. The consumption on foreign goods is
lower because the government collects the lump-sum taxes in terms of foreign goods
from the consumer to finance the foreign reserves. In addition, the deterioration of
terms of trade caused by accumulating of the foreign reserves makes the foreign goods
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Figure 2.4: Simulation results
Notes: red solid lines are for the competitive equilibrium without the government intervention and blue
dash lines are for the benevolent government.
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more expensive. Thus, the consumer consumes less foreign goods. Furthermore, the
consumption on domestic goods is also lower. This is because more domestic goods are
exported due to the accumulation of foreign reserves. However, higher foreign reserves
generate higher knowledge stocks and outputs in the future, so the economy grows faster.
Since the economy grows faster consumers consume more with higher output. Once the
economy reaches the steady-state, the government decreases the speed of accumulation
of the foreign reserves and terms of trade starts being improved. Thus, when the steady-
state is achieved, the consumption of domestic goods is lower than the CE while the
consumption of foreign goods is higher than the CE. This shows the government takes
into account the growth effects from the export externalities.
It is more clear to show the role of the government decision by comparing the level
of the foreign reserves corresponding to no externality case. Figure 2.5 shows that the
different optimal level of foreign reserves when there is no externality.
Figure 2.5: The foreign reserves with externality and no externality
Notes: The blue dash line is the level of the foreign reserves with externalities, ζx = 0.61 and the red
solid line is the foreign reserves with no externality, ζx = 0.00.
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With the benchmark parameter, ζx = 0.61, the government accumulates the foreign
reserves over time and the level of foreign reserves is 0.5 at the steady-state level. On
the other hand, the optimal foreign reserves are negative when there is no externality,
ζx = 0.00. In other words, the government does not save in the foreign country, rather
borrows from the foreign country. This result follows the argument that the benefits of
improving the terms of trade and consumption smoothing are greater than the benefits
of faster growth through export externalities.
To describe the impact on the welfare of the government policy, I compute the welfare
gains from accumulating foreign reserves. Define CE as the competitive equilibrium with
no government and BG as the equilibrium solved by the benevolent government. The
welfare gain is measured by the effect of considering the externalities that make the CE
equal to the BG in proportion to the consumption in the CE. This calculation explicitly
takes into account the cost of reducing consumption when switching to an economy
without foreign reserves. Welfare gains from accumulating foreign reserves, θ defined as
∞∑
t=0
βtu((1 + θCE)cCEt ) =
∞∑
t=0
βtu(cBGt ) (2.19)
With the calibrated values, the welfare gains from accumulating foreign reserves are
0.05% of permanent consumption when the government intervenes. This is less than
the average foreign reserves to GDP ratio since 1980. However, this number is fairly
close to the average ratio prior to 2000.
2.5.3 Export externalities and foreign reserves decisions
In the previous section, I show the case where the government accumulates foreign
reserves with the calibrated parameters. However, it is not always optimal for the
government to accumulate foreign reserves. The optimal level of the foreign reserves
is determined by comparing the growth effects through exports and the benefits of the
consumption smoothing and the tariff policy. The magnitude of the two effects depends
on the size of the export externalities. Suppose the export externalities are large, then
exporting the domestic goods significantly increases the level of knowledge stock in the
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next period. With the high knowledge stock, the economy can produce more domestic
goods tomorrow. Thus, the economy experiences faster growth by sacrificing today’s
consumption of domestic goods. In this regard, the government has an incentive to hold
positive foreign reserves to induce high terms of trade, which can lead to high exports
for fast growth.
On the other hand, when export externalities are small, the benefits from the con-
sumption smoothing motivation and improvement of terms of trade is stronger than
the growth effects. Therefore, the government holds negative foreign reserves, which is
borrowing from abroad at the risk-free interest rate. By borrowing in terms of foreign
goods the terms of trade become lower, meaning that imported foreign goods become
cheaper so the consumers consume more foreign goods today. Also, lower terms of trade
imply that the government decides not to stimulate exports and consume more domestic
goods today as well as imported goods. This is related to the consumption smoothing
motivation because the agents know that the economy will have higher income tomor-
row, so it borrows foreign goods today. In addition, similar to the optimal tariff policy,
the government induces better terms of trade to increase the consumer’s welfare by
borrowing foreign goods.
This mechanism is shown in Figure 2.6. This graph illustrates the optimal foreign
reserves level depending on the size of the export externalities. I vary the external-
ity parameter ζx and see the government decisions on foreign reserves. The baseline
model has externality parameter 0.65 and the foreign reserves reach to 0.74 in period
10 and decrease to 0.51 which is the steady-state level. As the size of foreign reserves
become smaller, the optimal level of foreign reserves also decreases. When the external-
ity parameter is 0.5, the government is almost indifferent between intervention and no
intervention. Once the externality parameter is less than 0.5, consumption today gives
higher welfare than exporting, so the government borrows to improve terms of trade.
This exercise provides different foreign reserves policy implications in developing
countries. The countries having high export externalities would hold high foreign re-
serves to enhance exports through the deterioration of the terms of trade. On the other
hand, the countries having low export externalities would receive capital inflow from
foreign countries to gain welfare improvement through consumption smoothing and bet-
ter terms of trade.
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Figure 2.6: Export externalities and Foreign reserves decisions
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Notes: Externality is the export externality parameter ζx. Each line represents the optimal foreign
reserves obtained by solving the benevolent government problem with different externality parameter.
2.5.4 Competitive equilibrium with private savings
I showed the optimal actions of the private agents are less efficient than the benevolent
government. To achieve higher welfare the government uses foreign reserves. Then it
is natural to consider that the existing government’s external saving technology might
be the source of efficiency because the private agents are not allowed to save. Hence,
in this section, I discuss the welfare gains just from internalizing the externalities by
comparing the competitive equilibrium with private savings and no government to the
equilibrium of the benevolent government.
All environments are the same except the consumer’s problem. The consumer now
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can save foreign goods in the foreign country by buying foreign bonds with the risk-
free interest rate. This will change two equations compared to competitive equilibrium
without savings: the consumer’s budget constraint and the trade balance. The budget
constraint of the consumer includes savings of s. These are the external savings, so it
must be saved in terms of foreign goods. Since the government does not exist, transfers
are dropped from the budget constraint. The following equation is the consumer’s
budget constraint with savings.
cDt + pt(c
F
t + st+1) = wtLt + pit + ptRfst (2.20)
Also, substituting (2.20) and (2.6) into (2.12), the trade balance becomes
xt − ptcFt = pt (st+1 −Rfst) (2.21)
which is similar to the benevolent government trade balance. The definition and the
characterization of the competitive equilibrium for this economy with private saving is
defined in appendix (A.3).
In this setup, the private agents sell the foreign bonds i.e., borrowing rather than
buying them i.e., lend. Figure 2.7 illustrates the simulation results when private bor-
rowing is allowed. The red solid lines are the competitive equilibrium while the blue
dash lines show the government decision. The consumers know that they will have a
higher output tomorrow due to the accumulation of knowledge. Hence, the consumers
borrow to smooth their consumption. In fact, this action badly affects the growth of
the economy. The borrowing in the private sector deteriorates the terms of trade in the
first 10 periods, so the economy exports less. Thus, during these periods, the imports
are much higher with better terms of trade. This hinders knowledge accumulation, and
thus the economy grows slowly. This situation shows the opposite of the action of the
benevolent government. Because the future growth benefits from the export external-
ities outweigh the utility from consuming foreign goods today, the government would
save. On the contrary, not internalizing the externalities, the private agents would bor-
row. Therefore, opening a capital account is not favorable to the government and the
accumulation of the foreign reserves generates higher welfare gain than the competitive
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equilibrium with no private saving.
The welfare gains from correcting externalities are higher when private savings are
allowed. I compute the welfare gains with the following way.
∞∑
t=0
βtu((1 + θCEs)cCEst ) =
∞∑
t=0
βtu(cBGt ) (2.22)
θCEs represents the welfare gains and cCEst is the consumption level of the com-
petitive equilibrium with private saving at each period t. The welfare gains in this
environment are 0.60%.
2.5.5 Subsidy on exports
I examined the role of foreign reserves as a policy tool, but the government could have
used the export subsidy (or tariff) if the WTO allowed them. Thus, I investigate the
welfare implication of the export subsidy as a government policy tool in this section.
This means that the government will choose the optimal level of subsidies on the export.
The results from this environment will help to compare with the argument of the optimal
tariff theory.13
In terms of model, the domestic consumer still receives subsidies from the govern-
ment so there is no change in the consumer problem. However, the government budget
constraint includes expenditure associated with the export subsidies. In other words,
the government finances the export subsidies by tax revenues from the consumer and
the tax is a lump-sum fashion. As same as the model with the foreign reserves the sub-
sidy is denominated in the foreign goods. In this environment the government budget
constraint is :
Tt = xtτt (2.23)
where τt is the export subsidies.
13I use subsidies on the exports, not the tariffs. But I can interpret the negative subsidies as tariffs.
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Not only the government budget constraint, but the domestic goods market-clearing
condition is also affected by the export subsidies. Domestic output will be distributed to
domestic consumption and exports. Moreover, τtxt are subsidized by the government.
14
cDt + (1− τt)xt = Yt (2.24)
The government pays τtxt with the lump-sum tax collected from the consumer in
terms of foreign goods. Combining the consumer’s budget constraint (2.2), the govern-
ment budget constraint (2.23), and domestic goods market clearing condition (2.24),
the trade balance can be obtained.
ptc
F
t − (1− τt)xt = ptτtxt (2.25)
Furthermore, the foreign demand function for the export is changed because the
export goods become cheaper in the foreign country due to the export subsidy. Hence,
the demand for the export with an export subsidy is as follow.
xt =
(
(1− τ) 1
pt
)−φ
Y ? (2.26)
This part is crucial for analyzing the export subsidy. Figure 2.8 shows the levels of
subsidies and volume of the exports according to the different externality parameters,
ζx. When the externalities are high enough, the subsidies on the exporting goods are
big. Since the economy has high export externalities, it prefers exporting today so
provides subsidies to the exporting sector. Due to the subsidies, the exporting goods
become cheaper, meaning that the terms of trade deteriorate. This stimulates exports
and the economy will grow faster. This result is also shown in the right-hand side of
Figure 2.8. With the high externality parameter, the economy exports more. As the
externalities become smaller, the subsidies become smaller and subsidies turn into taxes
14It might be easy for the negative sign of τ . If τ is negative, then it will be a tax on exports. Thus,
the firm has to pay export tax to the government and the government gives subsidies to the consumer
by using the export tax revenue.
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(negative subsidies) with even the positive externalities if it is small. This implies that
the economy can achieve higher utility by consuming goods more today rather than
exporting goods if the export externalities are small. This result is consistent with
Figure 2.6.
I also calculate the welfare gain using subsidies in the situation where the private
savings are allowed, and it is 17%. This is relatively higher than the welfare gain using
foreign reserves so it can be concluded that subsidies (taxes) are more efficient than
foreign reserves. Nevertheless, the direct export subsidies (taxes) are forbidden by the
WTO rules, the foreign reserves can be used as an alternative policy tool.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I propose an endogenous growth model of a small open economy with
export externalities that provide a plausible explanation for different policies regarding
the foreign reserves in various countries. I argue that some countries with high export
externalities can accelerate their economic growth by accumulating foreign reserves and
this can be achieved through export spillovers from the trade relationships with foreign
countries.
The key factor in the model is knowledge spillovers through exports, and it can be
internalized by the government, but not by private agents. The consumers and the
firms do not consider the growth effects from the exports so the exports would be less
than the socially optimal level if there is no government intervention. However, the
government takes into account the export externalities that induce faster growth of the
economy, and thus it uses the foreign reserves as a policy tool to manipulate the terms
of trade for stimulating exports. By increasing the foreign reserves, the terms of trade
are deteriorated, so the price of domestic goods become cheaper. This leads to higher
foreign demand for domestic goods, so the home country exports more and grow faster.
However, this mechanism works only if the export externalities are large enough.
When the export externalities are positive but small, the government would hold a neg-
ative level of foreign reserves, implying borrowing from abroad at the risk-free interest
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rate. This is because the benefits of the consumption smoothing motivation and im-
provement of terms of trade by borrowing foreign goods outweigh the growth effects
from higher exports. Therefore, the government has an incentive to improve the terms
of trade to increases its welfare.
I calibrated the model with data from Taiwan and showed the optimal choice for
the foreign reserves. I found that the government accumulates foreign reserves faster
until the economy reaches the steady-state level. During this period, the terms of trade
are high and show faster growth of the economy with higher exports. Once it converges
to the steady-state, it is not necessary to enhance the exports anymore, so the optimal
foreign reserves are determined at the level that maintains the steady-state level of the
economy. The welfare gain from accumulating foreign reserves is 0.05% of permanent
consumption in the economy with no government policy when the consumers cannot
save internationally.
Also, I vary the externality parameters to examine the different optimal level of
foreign reserves. The results show that as the export externalities become smaller,
the growth effects through exports become smaller too, and thus the optimal level of
foreign reserves decreases. Therefore, even though the export externalities are positive,
the government chooses to hold negative foreign reserves.
When I allow private saving, the welfare gain becomes larger, 0.60% since the private
agents who do not internalize the externalities would borrow by expecting higher income
in the future. Thus, the welfare gain from correcting externalities is bigger in this
situation.
Comparing the welfare gain using subsidies and foreign reserves, the export subsidies
are more efficient than foreign reserves. However, the international trade rules do not
allow the export subsidies so foreign reserves can be used as the government policy tool
in many countries.
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Figure 2.7: Simulation results
Notes: red solid lines are for the competitive equilibrium allowing private saving without the government
intervention and blue dash lines are for the benevolent government.
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Figure 2.8: Subsidies and export according to different externalities
Notes: Externality is the export externality parameter ζx. Each line represents the optimal subsidies and
exports obtained by solving the benevolent government problem with different externality parameter.
Chapter 3
Sovereign spread movements in
emerging economics: terms of
trade matter
3.1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the high mean and volatility of interest rate spreads in emerging
economies. We document that some emerging economies experience a decrease in the
negative correlation between real GDP and interest rate spreads for the last two decades.
As a matter of fact, it is observed in the data that interest rates oscillate regardless of a
favorable domestic economic performance. Figure 3.1 shows the Mexican interest rate
spread for the last twenty years and its relationship with real GDP and terms of trade.
The interest rate spread in Mexico displays sharp rises in 1998 and 2014, even though
the economy does not experience deep recessions during these years. Moreover, during
these years, the interest rate spread in Mexico follow more closely the movements of the
terms of trade series. This observation corresponds to the puzzle proposed in Tomz and
Wright (2007). They found that the negative correlation between output and default of
a country is remarkably week. Also, they show evidence of countries defaulting on their
sovereign debts during good times while making repayments during bad times. This
paper addresses this puzzle by arguing that foreign conditions can explain this issue.
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Figure 3.1: Spreads and Cyclical Components in Mexico
The framework presented in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) is beneficial to analyze
the spread behavior because this class of model is able to derive the interest rates
endogenously.1 However, it has been proven difficult to obtain three features of the
interest rates with sovereign default models. Arellano (2008) shows countercyclical
interest rate spreads by introducing convex costs of default. This yields defaults to be
more likely to occur during recessions. Nevertheless, the mean spread that the model
provides is 3.58% which is relatively low compared to the mean spread of Argentina,
which is 10.25%. Also, only few fluctuations of spread are observed with good economic
conditions due to the structural features of the probability of default. In fact, the spread
generated by the model is almost zero when the country is hit by good endowment
shocks. Mendoza and Yue (2012) achieve large volatility of spread in their baseline
model by introducing endogenous default costs, but fail also to capture the high mean
spread shown in the data. This is because spread and default probabilities are linked
to each other directly. Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) and Chatterjee and Eyigungor
(2012) are able to improve the spread behavior in the sovereign default models by
incorporating long-duration bonds. This helps to increase mean and standard deviation
of spread; however, those studies cannot explain why spreads can be high during good
1Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005) assume exogenous interest rates since
it is useful to explain business cycles of developing countries. High volatility and countercyclicality of
interest rates are regarded as crucial parts to explain the cyclical movement of aggregate output and
prices.
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times in the economy. The high volatility of spreads is mainly accomplished by the
large dispersion of spreads with low endowments while the standard deviation with
high endowments is significantly small.
This paper proposes a stochastic general equilibrium model of sovereign default
with endogenous default risk in order to explain the interest rate behavior in emerging
economies. The key feature of this paper is that the model incorporates an exogenous
foreign shock called terms of trade. In the model, a negative terms of trade shock
act in two ways. First, the country spends more in foreign products for consumption.
Second, the terms of trade have direct impacts on the level of foreign currency debts
that sovereigns owe to foreign lender. This model works with the assumption that
sovereigns issue their bonds in foreign prices. As shown in Eichengreen and Hausmann
(1999) and Jeanne (2003), emerging economies tend to issue debt in foreign currency
because their local currency present high fluctuations and lack of credibility2 Since
debt is issued in foreign currency, the countries are vulnerable to changes in world
prices. In other words, when the adverse terms of trade shocks hit the economy, the
sovereign immediately encounters an unexpected enlarged debt burden. Consequently,
the probability of default is not only affected by countries GDP shocks but also the
terms of trade shocks. This provides an explanation of why terms of trade shocks can
lead to higher and more volatile spread movements, regardless of the GDP performance.
As mentioned above developing countries experience high volatility of terms of trade
and output. More specifically, terms of trade shocks are more volatile than GDP shocks
in emerging economies. This implies that the terms of trade shocks are an important
factor to consider when studying them. Moreover, as shown in Kose (2002) an important
source for the repayment of foreign debt is export revenue and this is largely affected by
the terms of trade. Terms of trade are often studied in the sovereign default models. Na,
Schmitt-Grohe´, Uribe, and Yue (2018), Gu (2015), and Asonuma (2016) endogenously
induce the deterioration of the terms of trade and real exchange rate. This paper makes
distinctions from those papers by assuming terms of trade shocks as exogenous. Popov
and Wiczer (2014) assume an exogenous path of terms of trade but he examines the
role of terms of trade penalties and focuses on changes in trade volumes. In contrast,
2Du and Schreger (2016) show that foreign currency debt composition has decreased since 2004.
Nevertheless, they still have a significant level of foreign currency debt.
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we focus in analyzing the changes in debt burden contingent to terms of trade. Cuadra
and Sapriza (2006) study also an exogenous terms of trade shock when the production
side buy intermediate imported goods. In their model, the terms of trade shocks are
used as if they are productivity shocks so the terms of trade shocks generate real GDP
movement. However, this mechanism violates the result in Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) that
proves that terms of trade do not have first order effects in real GDP3 Moreover, they
do not have the convex default costs so the frequency of default generated by the model
is unusually small. In this paper we involve both endowment shocks and the terms of
trade shocks, while also considering a convex default cost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 empirical evidence, Section
3 the model, Section 4 quantitative analysis, Section 5 conclusion.
3.2 Empirical Evidence
3.2.1 Currency composition of sovereign external debt
In this section, we construct the ratio of foreign currency sovereign external debt to total
debt in developing countries. This helps to develop the idea that the terms of trade
shocks are of importance to the fluctuations of the economy in emerging economies via
foreign currency sovereign debt owed to foreign investors. The definition of external
debt is adopted from Du and Schreger (2016). We deviate from their methodology
because we are only interested in studying the government debt.4 Hence, we use the
definition of sovereign external debt as any debt issued by the government in developing
countries and owed to nonresidents, regardless of the market of issuance.
Debt is categorized by three dimensions: issue sector, issue currency, and issue mar-
ket. Issuance sector is divided into the government and the corporate sector. The debt
issued by the central or local governments is counted as government debt while all debt
issued by the private sector is regarded as corporate debt. The classification of issue
currency is determined by which currency debt is denominated when issued. Local
3They also show that the terms of trade do not act as a productivity shock in standard models while
they do affect real income and consumption in a country.
4Their definition of external debt includes both public and private debt in order to analyze how
default decisions are affected by debt denomination in public and private sectors. However, this paper
considers only public debt. Thus, we define sovereign external debt instead of external debt.
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currency (LC) debt refers to debt that is issued in the currency of issuance country
while foreign currency (FC) debt is denominated in another country’s currency. Lastly,
issuance market is broken down into two markets. When debt is issued under the do-
mestic law inside a country, it is called domestic debt; on the other hand, international
debt follows foreign law and issued in international markets. Among these categories,
this paper mainly addresses the combined category of government as issuer sector, for-
eign currency as issue currency, and both markets as issue market in order to study
sovereign external debt.
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) provides amount of outstanding debt data
by each classification. However, debt data by debt holder - nonresidents or residents -,
which is the main part of definition of external debt, are not available. Hence, we follow
Du and Schreger (2016) to construct the currency composition of sovereign external
debt. They make two assumptions for debt holding of nonresidents. First, nonresidents
hold all debts in international market, which implies that all international debts are
regarded as external debt. Second, nonresidents do not hold any FC debt in domestic
market.5 Based on these two assumptions, the FC sovereign external debt is constructed
as follows: amount of outstanding FC debt issued by the government in international
market.
Table 3.1 provides the share of FC sovereign external debt in total sovereign debt.
The total sovereign debt is defined as all debts issued by the government so it consists of
both domestic debt and external debt.6 The analysis of this paper is proceed based on
sovereign external debt, and it is expected that countries with higher share of external
debt denominated in FC are more likely to be exposed by terms of trade shocks. In
Table 3.1, although the substantial heterogeneity for the ratio of FC external debt to
total debt is observed, it is sensible that countries are considerably under the influence
of it. Moreover, there are some countries that heavily rely on FC debt owed to foreign
creditors such as Peru, Argentina, Lebanon, and Lithuania. In particular, the countries
that experienced sovereign default events tend to have higher percentage of FC external
debt. Argentina had carried on more than 75% of external debt in FC until the default
periods and reduced it to approximately 50% in the first half of the 2000’s. Peru also has
5They document that the amount of outstanding foreign currency debt in domestic market is notably
small so the second assumption is sensible.
6The definition of domestic debt in this context is any debt owed to residents within the country.
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Table 3.1: Foreign Currency Debt Composition
Average 2004 2015
Argentina∗ 79.6 74.9 43.4
Brazil 7.3 4.9 4.4
Chile 12.9 20.8 16.3
Colombia 22.8 22.8 25.5
Croatia 45.7 59.3 46.1
Hungary 22.7 19.8 27.0
Indonesia 13.9 3.2 30.8
Lebanon 35.2 51.5 44.8
Lithuania 83.8 73.2 79.5
Malaysia 3.9 9.0 3.3
Mexico 16.2 27.3 15.1
Peru∗ 65.1 84.2 38.7
Philippines 24.9 33.9 23.4
Russia∗ 31.2 48.5 38.1
South Africa 7.2 10.6 9.7
Turkey 19.0 16.5 29.6
Notes: * indicates countries that experienced default events. 2005 data is used for Mexico and Malaysia
for the 2004 column and 2007 data and 2008 data are used for South Africa and Chile for the 2004
column respectively. They are first year of data availability.
been maintained high share of FC external debt on average. In case of Russia, almost
half of the total debt is FC debt owed to nonresidents in 2004 which is significantly
large enough to be affected by exchange rate movements.
One of the results from Du and Schreger (2016) is that sovereigns have been using
more LC when issuing external debt in government sector so there is a tendency of the
decrease in the proportion of FC external debt in total external debt.7 Nevertheless,
analyzing FC external debt is worthy. Since they compare the FC external debt with
total external debt, the expansion or contraction of the amount of total external debt
is not taken into consideration in their construction of currency composition. In other
words, the importance of FC external debt could be underestimated if the countries issue
7They analyze FC external debt
Total external debt
while this paper analyze FC external debt
External debt+ Internal debt
. Thus, the share
of foreign currency external debt in this paper is affect by the amount of debt owe to residents in a
country.
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more external debt than domestic debt. However, the measure of currency composition
used in this paper reflects this issue since the definition of total sovereign debt includes
both domestic debt and external debt. If the amount of domestic debt gets smaller, then
the share of FC external debt in total sovereign debt increases which means external debt
in FC becomes a more essential part of the debt in the countries. Actually, all countries
except Hungary and Russia in Table 3.1 display continuous increases in the amount
of external debt denominated in FC.8 Furthermore, it is not explicitly shown that the
share of FC external debt has been decreasing in Figure 3.2 with our data construction.
Indonesia, Hungary, Turkey, and Lithuania, for instance, have kept expanding the share
of external debt in FC. The LC debt in domestic market rapidly rose in Croatia around
2004 so the share sharply decreased at that time but it started to issue more FC debt
in international market in 2009 so the share has been following the growing trend since
the time. In addition, other countries hold more or less a constant share of FC external
debt. Those empirical evidence illustrates that external debt in FC are still a crucial
part of debt in developing countries.
3.3 Terms of trade, GDP and spread across countries
The data presented in Table 3.2 and 3.3 are statistics for the terms of trade, GDP, and
spread across 24 developing countries. In this paper, the terms of trade (TOT) are
defined as the price of imports relative to the price of exports.
TOT =
PM
PX
In order to construct the terms of trade, quarterly merchandise customs imports and
exports data 1991Q1 to 2015Q4 are obtained from World Bank Global Economic Mon-
itor (GEM).9 By using current and constant value of import and export each deflator
is calculated. Afterwards the import and the export deflators are used for the price of
imports and the price of exports respectively. Hence, the terms of trade are constructed
8Hungary and Russia has been reducing the amount of foreign currency external debt since 2014.
9World Development Indicators (WDI) provides imports and exports data across countries, but this
is annual data. Thus, we interpolate annual data to transform to quarterly data and compare it with the
quarterly merchandise customs imports and exports and we found that those two series are coincided
through the sample period.
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Figure 3.2: Foreign Debt Profile for Emerging Economies
by import deflator over export deflator. The quarterly GDP is also provided from GEM
and the time period is the same as the one in imports and exports data. The interest
rate spread data are taken from J.P. Morgan’s EMBI + database.10 The terms of trade
and output are log and HP detrended.
Table 3.2 provides standard deviation of the terms of trade, GPD, and spread. It also
provides the mean of spread in each country since this paper focuses on the behavior of
spread. Although there is a cross-country heterogeneity, in almost all sample countries,
the standard deviations of TOT are bigger than those of GDP. In other words, TOT is
more fluctuate than GDP in most of countries. This fact is crucial for the analysis of the
paper since this indicates that more fluctuations of the economy can be driven by the
terms of trade shocks with high volatility. Also, defaulted countries, such as Argentina,
Ecuador, and Russia, show much higher mean and volatile movement of spread. In
10The spread data are not a balanced data across countries, so we used series of spread available up
to 2015Q4.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics in Emerging Economies
σ(TOT) σ(GDP) σ(spread) µ(spread)
Argentina 0.045 0.040 18.24 15.99
Brazil 0.041 0.015 3.92 5.66
Chile 0.090 0.018 0.59 1.46
China 0.036 0.010 0.55 1.18
Colombia 0.073 0.013 2.07 3.56
Dominican Rep 0.022 0.023 3.30 5.39
Ecuador 0.295 0.020 8.38 12.33
Egypt 0.034 0.015 1.74 2.55
Hungary 0.016 0.015 1.58 1.80
Indonesia 0.068 0.033 1.44 2.89
Kazakhstan 0.264 0.024 2.74 4.28
Korea 0.035 0.023 1.04 1.31
Malaysia 0.027 0.018 1.25 1.78
Mexico 0.040 0.023 1.51 2.75
Morocco 0.016 0.013 2.43 2.30
Peru 0.073 0.018 1.96 3.51
Philippines 0.046 0.013 1.52 3.46
Poland 0.096 0.014 0.90 1.71
Russia 0.098 0.029 11.26 7.28
South Africa 0.032 0.012 1.19 2.26
Sri Lanka 0.024 0.009 4.33 6.01
Tunisia 0.014 0.011 0.92 1.84
Turkey 0.030 0.036 2.20 4.02
Ukraine 0.023 0.043 6.23 7.46
particular, the volatility of TOT in Ecuador is approximately 14 times bigger than
its GDP. Hence, it can be seen that Ecuador has been affected by volatile terms of
trade shocks. However, it is unclear that the terms of trade shocks is a main factor for
movement of spread based on magnitude of standard deviation, but correlation with
spread will help to improve this issue.
Table 3.3 shows different combinations of correlations among TOT, GDP and spread
in the sample countries. First, the negative correlations between GDP and spread are
achieved and also the positive correlations between TOT and spread are presented in
most countries. This implies that the deterioration of the terms of trade coincide with
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Table 3.3: Correlations in Emerging Economies
ρ(TOT, spread) ρ(GDP, spread) ρ(TOT,GDP)
Argentina -0.026 -0.647 -0.066
Brazil 0.205 -0.198 -0.553
Chile 0.528 -0.335 -0.478
China -0.080 -0.007 0.257
Colombia 0.267 -0.197 -0.485
Dominican Rep 0.020 -0.641 -0.006
Ecuador 0.517 -0.445 -0.687
Egypt 0.082 -0.189 0.084
Hungary 0.141 -0.290 0.222
Indonesia 0.574 -0.284 -0.507
Kazakhstan -0.440 -0.607 0.541
Korea -0.209 -0.633 0.524
Malaysia 0.061 -0.485 0.116
Mexico 0.443 0.005 -0.466
Morocco -0.126 0.135 -0.099
Peru 0.332 -0.156 -0.263
Philippines 0.029 -0.326 0.262
Poland 0.007 0.159 0.137
Russia 0.241 -0.487 -0.681
South Africa 0.223 -0.250 -0.021
Sri Lanka 0.433 -0.430 0.229
Tunisia 0.556 -0.162 0.017
Turkey 0.169 -0.449 0.079
Ukraine -0.194 -0.423 -0.157
the increase in spread in general. Moreover, even though it is hard to find a certain
pattern between ρ(TOT, spread) and ρ(TOT, spread), there are nine countries having
higher correlation of spread with TOT than with GDP. This can be direct evidence for
the impacts of TOT on movement of interest rate spread. For example, Mexico have
significantly high correlation of spread with TOT while there is almost no correlation
with GDP: hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the fluctuation of Mexican spread is
mainly affected by the terms of trade shocks. This interpretation can be generalized to
any countries showing higher correlation between spread and TOT.
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3.4 Model
In this section, we propose a model of that incorporates two sources of uncertainty in a
country, a domestic and a foreign. We work with a framework that extends the sovereign
default models introduced in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008). We use
this last one to incorporate a source of external uncertainty called terms of trade.
Consider a small open economy where there are two types of shocks, a domestic and
a foreign. On one hand, the domestic shock is going to be represented by real GDP
movements. On the other, the foreign shock is going to be represented by terms of trade
movements. Let yt and pt represent output and terms of trade in period t, respectively.
As discussed previously, it is standard to assume terms of trade as an exogenous variable
for small open economies. We consider this in order to construct the following stochastic
system [
ln yt+1
ln pt+1
]
= A
[
ln yt
ln pt
]
+
[
εyt+1
εpt+1
]
, (3.1)
where the roots of the second order polynomial det (I2 −Ax) = 0 lie outside the complex
unit circle and the errors vector is a binormal distribution with mean 0 and variance-
covariance matrix Σ. With this formulation we are able to tailor a correlation between
contemporaneous real GDP and terms of trade.11
There are two types of tradable goods in this economy, a domestic and a foreign.
In every period, a representative household purchases these two types of goods and
transform them into a final consumption good using the following Armington aggregator
technology,
C =
(
λc−ηd + (1− λ)c−ηf
)− 1
η
,
where C represents the final aggregated good consumption, cd the domestic good con-
sumption, cf the foreign good consumption, λ ∈ [0, 1] a parameter that captures home
11As shown in Kehoe and Ruhl (2008), it is a common mistake to misrepresent what real GDP is
in a model. Moreover, standard models with a production side that buy imported goods at the price
of terms of trade capture a spurious correlation between real GDP and terms of trade. If real GDP is
measured correctly in them, the correlation between real GDP and terms of trade should be close to
zero.
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bias, and η ∈ [−1,∞) a parameter that controls the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods. The representative household is able to purchase these
goods taking the output available in the period and an amount of taxes that the gov-
ernment issues in a lump-sum fashion as given. The representative household is a risk
averse agent that obtains utility from the stream of final consumption goods obtained
in every period as
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu (Ct)
]
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that captures a discount factor across periods and u(·)
is an increasing and strictly concave function.
In this economy there is also a benevolent government whose objective is to maximize
the utility of the representative household. In order to achieve this, it has two main
decisions to take. The first decision is either to honor or default in its sovereign bonds
obligations. If the government takes the decision of honoring them, it has access to
international financial markets where it can buy or sell one period maturity sovereign
bonds. Then, the second decision is how much of these bonds to purchase given a price
schedule contingent to the amount of these new bonds and the shocks the economy
experiences. Let B, B′, and q(B′, y, p) represent the amount of sovereign bonds due,
the amount of new sovereign bonds purchases, and the price of these at any given period.
We introduce the assumption that the international financial markets are managed
only in foreign goods. This is, the sovereign bonds return and purchases have to be
done in foreign terms. Because of this, the value of sovereign bonds in each period will
be subject to the terms of trade shock.
We model two types of penalties for defaulting in sovereign debt, exclusion of finan-
cial markets and output losses. With these penalties we want to capture the fact that
countries that default in their debt experience a temporary exclusion to international
borrowing and periods of poor output performance. We assume that if a government
defaults in their debt, this will be erased entirely and it will enter a financial autarkic
environment. In addition, the country will experience an output cost that limit its en-
dowment. The economy will remain in this financial autarky for a stochastic number of
periods and will re-enter the financial markets with an exogenous probability.
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Let x represent exports, the resources exiting the economy. The balance trade
condition for the repayment state can be expressed as
x− pcf = pq(B′, y, p)B′ − pB.
The left-hand side is the current account while the right-hand side is the negative of the
capital account of the economy. This is, any surplus(deficit) that the capital account ex-
periences due to the government’s sovereign debt position will imply a deficit(surplus) of
the current account. The balance trade condition for the default state can be expressed
as
x− pcf = 0.
Considering the exclusion of financial markets penalty of default, the balance trade
condition will imply that the current account cannot experience any kind of surplus or
deficit.
The resource constraint of the government will show how the domestic good endow-
ment can be consumed in every period. On one hand, if the government chooses to
repay its debt, the resource constraint will be
cd + x = y.
On the other hand, if the government chooses to default,
cd + x = h(y),
where h(·) is an increasing function such that h(y) ≤ y.12
There is a representative foreign lender who is able to borrow and lend risk-free bonds
at a constant international interest rate r∗ > 0. We assume it has perfect information
about the small open economy. This is, it can observe the level of output and terms
of trade that the small open economy experiences every period. The foreign lender is
risk neutral13 and maximizes expected profits over risky sovereign bonds from the small
12Realize that the output cost is defined as y − h(y) and is non-negative by definition.
13Cole and Kehoe (1996) explains that the risk neutrality of the foreign lenders reflect the fact that
69
open economy. We assume that the foreign lender maximizes profit only in foreign goods
terms. Let δ represent the probability of the government to default in its sovereign debt
position. Taking as given the default probability and the bond price, the foreign creditor
chooses B˜′ to maximizes
max
B˜′
{
qB˜′ −
(
1− δ
1 + r∗
)
B˜′
}
.
By the risk neutral nature of the foreign lender, the bond price schedule solution in
equilibrium must satisfy the first order condition of the previous problem. The bond
price schedule will be a result of the following break-even condition,
q =
1− δ
1 + r∗
. (3.2)
Realizing that δ ∈ [0, 1], we can infer that q ∈
[
0, 11+r∗
]
. Defining the sovereign interest
rate as r ≡ 1q − 1, we obtain that r = [r∗,∞). Finally, we define the sovereign bond
spread as S ≡ r − r∗.
The timing of the government problem is the following. In the beginning of the
period the government realizes the amount of sovereign bonds due B, the domestic
goods endowment shock y, and the terms of trade shock p. The government asses the
optimal relationship between domestic and foreign goods using p and the preferences
of the representative household. Then the government decides whether to honor or
default in its debt obligations. If it decides to honor its debt, the government updates its
sovereign bond holdings B′ taking as given the sovereign bond price schedule q(B′, y, p)
and constrained to its resource constraint and the balance trade condition. The foreign
lender takes the bond price q as given and supplies B˜′ matching B′. Purchases of foreign
and domestic take place. Finally, the representative household consumes the final good
by aggregating the domestic and foreign goods.
the size of an individual sovereign transaction is relatively small compared to the total international
credit market.
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3.4.1 Recursive Equilibrium
There are three variables that define the state of the government in every period: the
sovereign bonds due, the output shock, and the terms of trade shock. Define V (B, y, p)
as the value function of the government at the beginning of every period. Let us model
the first decision of the government as
V (B, y, p) = max
{
V R(B, y, p), V D(y, p)
}
(3.3)
where V R(B, y, p) and V D(y, p) represent the value of the government if it repays and
defaults in its debt obligations, respectively. Here, the government chooses which en-
vironment will yield the highest welfare for the representative household captured by
V R(B, y, p) and V D(y, p).
When the government chooses to repay, it chooses the amount of sovereign bonds to
sell or purchase as well as the household allocations that will maximize its welfare subject
to the resource constraint, the balance trade condition, the aggregation technology, and
a no-Ponzi condition. In order to do this, it takes the price schedule for the bonds as
given and a lower boundary for the sovereign bonds issuance B > 0. Thus,
V R(B, y, p) = max
x,cd,cf ,C,B′
{
u(C) + βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′, y′, p′)|(y, p)]} (3.4)
s.t. cd + x = y (Resource Constraint)
x− pcf = pq(B′, y, p)B′ − pB (Balance Trade Condition)
C =
(
λc−ηd + (1− λ)c−ηf
)− 1
η
(Aggregation Technology)
B′ ≥ −B. (No-Ponzi Condition)
When the government chooses to default, it chooses the household allocations that
will maximize its welfare subject to the resource constraint, the balance trade condition,
and the aggregation technology. In order to do this, it takes the default penalty and
the probability of returning to the financial markets φ ∈ [0, 1] as given. Recall that the
default penalties are the output costs and the zero current account restriction due to
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the financial market exclusion. Thus,
V D(y, p) = max
x,cd,cf ,C
{
u(C) + βE(y′,p′)
[
φV (0, y′, p′) + (1− φ)V D(y′, p′)|(y, p)]} (3.5)
s.t. cd + x = h(y) (Resource Constraint)
x− pcf = 0 (Balance Trade Condition)
C =
(
λc−ηd + (1− λ)c−ηf
)− 1
η
. (Aggregation Technology)
In order to define what is the probability of default for a government, it is useful
to characterize the set of output and terms of trade states in which a government finds
optimal to default contingent to a level of sovereign bond holdings. Specifically, define
the default set as the
D(B) = {(y, p) ∈ R2++ : V D(y, p) > V R(B, y, p)} . (3.6)
This set expresses that if the government sells B′ and the shocks of next period are
(y′, p′) ∈ D(B′), then the government will find it optimal to default on B′ next period.
Because of this, we can define the probability for a government to default on B′ by
measuring how likely is to end up in the states that live in D(B′). Given the stochastic
process that govern the movements of output and terms of trade shocks, call f(·) the
probability density function between shock states. Thus, the probability of default can
be expressed as
δ(B′, y, p) =
∫
(y′,p′)∈D(B′)
f
(
(y′, p′)|(y, p)) d(y′, p′). (3.7)
Consider the case where the government chooses a level of sovereign bonds B′ such
that there are no possible states in the next period in which it will default on them,
D(B′) = ∅. Then, with that amount of sovereign bonds the probability of default will
be zero, δ(B′, y, p) = 0. Also, consider the case when the government chooses a level
of sovereign bonds B′ such that default is for sure regardless of the shock realizations
in the next period, D(B′) = R2++. Then, with that amount of sovereign bonds the
probability of default will be one, δ(B′, y, p) = 1. Finally, realize that if the output and
terms of trade shocks have no persistency whatsoever, then the probability of default
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will only be contingent in the sovereign bond issues or purchases.
Now, the bond price schedule must satisfy the break-even condition (3.2) from the
representative foreign lender problem. Considering the probability of default, the rep-
resentative foreign lender must be consistent to (3.7). Thus, the bond price schedule
will be
q(B′, y, p) =
1− δ(B′, y, p)
1 + r∗
. (3.8)
Realize that this break-even condition will yield zero profit in expectation to the repre-
sentative foreign lender regardless of the quantity of sovereign bonds it purchases or sells
B˜′. Therefore, it will be willing to cover any amount of sovereign bonds the government
finds optimal to choose during the repayment state. In other words, the sovereign bond
market always clear in equilibrium B˜′ = B′.
Definition 3 (Recursive Equilibrium). The recursive equilibrium of this small open
economy will be a set of government value functions V (B, y, p), V R(B, y, p), V D(y, p)
and a sovereign bonds policy rule Bˆ′(B, y, p), a set of household consumption policy
rules cˆd(B, y, p), cˆf (B, y, p), and Cˆ(B, y, p), an exports policy rule xˆ(B, y, p), a default
set D(B, y, p), a default probability schedule δ(B, y, p), and bond price schedule q(B, y, p)
such that the following conditions are satisfied:
I Benevolent Government (Initial)
The default set D(B, y, p) is consistent with the set of government value functions
V (B, y, p), V R(B, y, p), and V D(y, p) and solves (3.3).
I Benevolent Government (Repayment)
If (y, p) /∈ D(B) and taking as given the bond price schedule q(B, y, p), the gov-
ernment chooses the sovereign bonds policy rule Bˆ′(B, y, p), the set of household
consumption policy rules cˆd(B, y, p), cˆf (B, y, p), and Cˆ(B, y, p), and the exports
policy rule xˆ(B, y, p) in order to solve (3.4) and its solution is consistent with
V R(B, y, p).
I Benevolent Government (Default)
If (y, p) ∈ D(B), the government chooses the set of household consumption policy
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rules cˆd(B, y, p), cˆf (B, y, p), and Cˆ(B, y, p), and the exports policy rule xˆ(B, y, p)
in order to solve (3.5) and its solution is consistent with V D(y, p).
I Default probability
The default probability schedule δ(B, y, p) is consistent with the default set D(B, y, p)
and (3.7).
I Bond Pricing
The bond pricing schedule q(B, y, p) is consistent with the probability of default
schedule δ(B, y, p) and (3.8).
3.4.2 Aggregate Recursive Equilibrium
The problem described in the previous section has an intratemporal condition between
consumption of foreign and domestic goods by the representative household. Specifically,
this intratemporal condition balances the terms of trade with the marginal rate of
substitution between foreign and domestic consumption goods,
p =
u′(C) · ∂C∂cf
u′(C) · ∂C∂cd
=
(
1− λ
λ
)(
cd
cf
)1+η
. (3.9)
Using the final consumption aggregator and (3.9), let us define the final consumption
price index as
P(p) ≡
(
λ
1
1+η + (1− λ) 11+η p η1+η
) 1+η
η
. (3.10)
This price lets us weight the price of the final consumption good in the economy con-
sidering how important are domestic and foreign goods in its aggregation. Notice that
the limit expression of home bias follow,
lim
λ→0
{P(p)} = 1 and lim
λ→1
{P(p)} = p.
On one hand, if there is complete home bias, the price index of the final consumption
good is not affected at all by the terms of trade. This result is intuitive because it tells us
that the representative household does not derive any utility from foreign consumption
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goods. On the other hand, if there is complete foreign bias, the price index of the final
consumption good is the complete terms of trade price.
Consider an aggregate version of the government’s problem when it chooses to repay,
V R(B, y, p) = max
C,B′
{
u(C) + βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′, y′, p′)|(y, p)]} (3.11)
s.t. P(p)C + pq(B′, y, p) = y + pB (Resource Constraint)
B′ ≥ −B. (No-Ponzi Condition)
Also, consider the aggregate version of the government’s problem when it chooses to
default,
V D(y, p) = max
cd,cf ,C
{
u(C) + βE(y′,p′)
[
φV (0, y′, p′) + (1− φ)V D(y′, p′)|(y, p)]} (3.12)
s.t. P (p)C = h(y) (Resource Constraint)
Definition 4 (Aggregate Recursive Equilibrium). The aggregate recursive equilibrium
of this small open economy will be a set of government value functions V (B, y, p),
V R(B, y, p), V D(y, p) and a sovereign bonds policy rule Bˆ′(B, y, p), a household final
consumption policy rule Cˆ(B, y, p), a final consumption good price index P(p), a default
set D(B, y, p), a default probability schedule δ(B, y, p), and bond price schedule q(B, y, p)
such that the following conditions are satisfied:
I Benevolent Government (Initial)
The default set D(B, y, p) is consistent with the set of government value functions
V (B, y, p), V R(B, y, p), and V D(y, p) and solves (3.3).
I Benevolent Government (Repayment)
If (y, p) /∈ D(B) and taking as given the bond price schedule q(B, y, p) and the final
consumption good price index P(p), the government chooses the sovereign bonds
policy rule Bˆ′(B, y, p) and the household final consumption policy rule Cˆ(B, y, p)
in order to solve (3.4) and its solution is consistent with V R(B, y, p).
I Benevolent Government (Default)
If (y, p) ∈ D(B) and taking as given the final consumption good price index P(p),
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the government chooses household final consumption policy rules Cˆ(B, y, p) in
order to solve (3.5) and its solution is consistent with V D(y, p).
I Price Index
The final consumption good price index follows (3.10).
I Default probability
The default probability schedule δ(B, y, p) is consistent with the default set D(B, y, p)
and (3.7).
I Bond Pricing
The bond pricing schedule q(B, y, p) is consistent with the probability of default
schedule δ(B, y, p) and (3.8).
Proposition 3.4.1 (Recursive Equilibrium Isomorphism). The equilibriums defined in
Definition 3 and Definition 4 are isomorphic.
Proof. See Appendix B.1. 
This transformation of the original problem is very useful for solving the model and
to understand how terms of trade shocks work in our environment. Firstly, realize that
the final consumption good price index is non-decreasing14 in terms of trade regardless
of the parameters λ and η,
P ′(p) =
(
(1− λ)P (p)
p
) 1
1+η
≥ 0.
This implies that, regardless of the complementarity or substitutability of the domestic
and foreign goods, the final consumption good price index will keep a monotonic behav-
ior throughout all the domain of the terms of trade. Moreover, the final consumption
good price index will work as a shock absorber of the terms of trade shock. This is, the
households will only experience a fraction of the terms of trade shock in terms of final
good expenditure. Therefore, terms of trade will have two main effects in the model.
The first effect is adjusting the price of final consumption goods. The second effect is
14Furthermore, it is strictly increasing as long as we assume there is no full home-bias in the model
λ ∈ [0, 1)
76
expanding or contracting the debt burden of sovereign bonds. This last effect is present
under the assumption that the sovereign government issues debt in foreign currency.
Proposition 3.4.2 (Default Sets Monotonicity). Pick an arbitrary level of sovereign
bonds B1 such that D(B1) 6= ∅, if B2 ≤ B1 then D(B1) ⊆ D(B2).
Proof. See Appendix B.1. 
This result is originally taken from Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Arellano (2008), and
Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and R´ıos-Rull (2007) and it is common in sovereign de-
fault models. This result tells us that incentives are monotonic with respect of sovereign
bonds. Hence, it is mainly followed because the bond pricing q(B′, y, p) is independent
from the sovereign bonds due in a period. In our model, this relationship does not ex-
ist because of the assumption of risk neutrality from the representative foreign lender.
Thus, given a level of output and terms of trade, the sovereign bonds due in the period
acts only as a shifter in the available amount of resources in the economy. Therefore,
if for a level of sovereign bonds a government finds optimal to default, then for a lower
level of sovereign bonds the default decision will still be optimal because the government
will have less resources overall.
Using Proposition 3.4.2 we can conclude that the bond pricing q(B, y, p) is non-
decreasing in sovereign bonds. Let us focus in the case where the government borrows
resources from foreign lenders. As the government increases the amount of borrowing,
the actual amount of resources received will decrease because the bond pricing contracts.
This resources reduction of borrowing compensates the default probability that the
government can incur in the following period.
3.4.3 No Persistency Case
Let us study the case in which the stochastic system proposed in (3.1) has no persistency,
therefore it is i.i.d. binormal distribution with mean 0 and variance-covariance matrix
Σ. In this case, the probability of default and the sovereign bond price schedule lose
their contingency with respect of GDP and terms of trade. This is because current levels
of GDP and TOT do not provide any information about the future realizations of them.
We assume also that there are no penalty costs, h(y) = y; and default is permanent,
φ = 0.
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Proposition 3.4.3 (No Resources Inflows). For every sovereign bonds B such that
D(B) 6= ∅, every feasible B′ will yield no resources inflows, q(B′)B′ −B ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.1. 
Default episodes happen when governments are unable to roll-over their debt. This
idea is captured with Proposition 3.4.3. If the government is in a state where he chooses
to default, all the feasible issuances of sovereign bonds must have not been enough to
cover the sovereign bonds due in the period. Specifically, there was no feasible issuances
of sovereign bonds that could have given a positive flux of resources from outside,
B − q(B′)B′ ≯ 0.
Proposition 3.4.4 (GDP Default Incentives). Pick an arbitrary level of terms of trade
p and sovereign bonds B such that D(B) 6= ∅, if y2 ≤ y1 and (y1, p) ∈ D(B) then
(y2, p) ∈ D(B).
Proof. See Appendix B.1. 
Default episodes also happen when economies experience recessions, periods where
GDP levels are below the trend. Proposition 3.4.4 is able to capture this idea. This
shows that there if a government finds optimal to default on a level of sovereign bonds
for a given recession, any deeper recession would make it default as well. This result is
driven mainly because the country will be poorer and there are not contracts available
that provide an influx of resources from abroad.
Proposition 3.4.5 (Terms of Trade Default Incentives). Pick an arbitrary level of
GDP y and sovereign bonds B such that D(B) 6= ∅, if p2 ≥ p1 and (y, p1) ∈ D(B) then
(y, p2) ∈ D(B).
Proof. See Appendix B.1. 
We have a similar result for the case of terms of trade rising higher than the trend.
Proposition 3.4.5 is able to capture this idea. This shows that there if a government finds
optimal to default on a level of sovereign bonds for a level of terms of trade, any higher
level of terms of trade would make it default as well. This result is driven mainly because
the country will experience more expensive goods from the exterior and the resources
that flow outside the country will grow because of the foreign good conversion.
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3.5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we study Mexico and its business cycles statistics. Also, we describe
the calibration process of the model fitting the parameters to the Mexican economy.
We solve the aggregate recursive equilibrium described in Definition 4 applying a value
function iteration process using a grid search method. The complete algorithm can be
found in Appendix B.2.
3.5.1 Data
Let us study the Mexican business cycle behavior as an emerging economy. Using
OECD Statistics, we obtain quarterly data seasonally adjusted at quarterly levels, and
at current and constant prices from 1993Q1 to 2016Q2 for the series of gross domestic
product, private final consumption expenditure, exports of goods and services, and im-
ports of goods and services. Also, using Global Financial Database, we obtain quarterly
data from 1997Q4 to 2016Q3 for the series of Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI+).
The series of EMBI+ is provided by J.P. Morgan and portrays the long-term spread
between yields from sovereign bond and the U.S. Treasuries. We construct the terms
of trade series as the ratio of imports price deflator and exports price deflator follow-
ing Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) methodology.15 We apply the HP-filter with a smoothing
parameter of 1600 to the real consumption, real output and terms of trade log-series in
order to obtain the cyclical components of them. In addition, we compute the ratio of
the difference between exports and imports, over GDP to construct the series of trade
balance.
Table 3.4 shows the business cycles statistics for the Mexican economy. The ta-
ble shows regular characteristics of emerging economies shown in Neumeyer and Perri
(2005). The volatility of consumption is higher compared to the volatility of GDP.
Another important characteristic is that trade balance is countercyclical. Nevertheless,
we are not able to find that interest rates (captured by the sovereign spread series) are
countercyclical after 1997Q4.16
15There are other ways to compute terms of trade. For example, e, Mendoza (1995) uses the ratio
of exports and imports volumes. We choose not to use this methodology for convenience. Establishing
terms of trade as the ratio of imports and exports deflator matches closely the movements of real
exchange rates.
16We analyzed this issue further. We use the database provided by Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and
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Table 3.4: Business Cycles Statistics for Mexico
Variable µ σ ρ(·,Spread) ρ(·,GDP) ρ(·,TOT)
Spread 2.71% 1.47% - 0.0352 0.2178
GDP - 2.22% 0.0352 - -0.4480
Terms of Trade - 2.56% 0.2178 -0.4480 -
Consumption - 2.65% -0.0367 0.9518 -0.4673
Trade Balance -0.84% 1.62% 0.3335 -0.4819 0.1501
Terms of trade also play an important feature. As documented in Mendoza (1995),
Kose (2002), and Broda (2004), there is a strong negative relationship between terms
of trade and real GDP in emerging countries. Also, the volatility of terms of trade is
higher compared to the volatility of GDP. An important feature we are able to provide is
that the correlation between terms of trade and the spreads is significantly higher than
the correlation between GDP and spreads. This seems to suggest that the movements
the Mexican experienced after 1997 may be better explained by movements in terms of
trade rather than movements in real GDP.
3.5.2 Calibration
We use the real GDP and terms of trade HP-filter log-series in order to estimate (3.1).
We assume that the errors vector components are independent from each other17 and
distributed as εyt+1 ∼ N(0, σ2y) and εyt+1 ∼ N(0, σ2y). We estimate the matrix A using
construct an implied EMBI+ series from 1994Q1 to 1997Q3. In the database the authors provide the
interest rate of several emerging economies from 1994Q1 to 2002Q2. We take the series of Mexican
interest rates and subtract the yield of US 10-year Treasury constant maturity. We find that the
constructed EMBI+ series resembles closely the original EMBI+ series in the quarters they overlap
with the exception of the period 2001Q2-2002Q2. Filling the missing quarters for the spread series we
are able to find that the interest rates (captured by the sovereign spread series) is countercyclical, with
a correlation of -0.4275.
17We make this assumption for simplicity. Nevertheless, we are expecting in relaxing this. The error
of the real GDP regression surely is correlated with contemporaneous terms of trade. In this way, the
assumption of the errors being independent should be worked upon.
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standard OLS regressions18,
A =
[
0.8399 −0.0291
−0.1466 0.5367
]
.
Once estimated the matrix A, we recover the observed errors and estimate the standard
deviations of the errors. The standard deviations of the GDP and terms of trade errors
are σy = 0.0105 and σp = 0.0203, respectively. Finally, we discretize the 2-dimensional
VAR(1) process into a 289 Markov chain (17 GDP and 17 terms of trade shock levels)
using a quadrature method algorithm following Tauchen and Hussey (1991) with a 3
standard deviations mean centered bandwidth.
We use a standard CRRA utility function to convey the representative household
preferences,
u(C) =
C1−σ
1− σ ,
where σ represents the constant relative risk aversion parameter. We settle this risk
aversion parameter to the value of 2. This is a common value in the international real
business cycles literature.
During default episodes we impose GDP penalty via the increasing function h(·).
An important issue to address when modeling this is its sensitivity contingent to the
state of the economy. We use Arellano (2008) convex GDP cost formulation,
h(y) =
y if y ≤ κE[y]κE[y] if y > κE[y] ,
where κ > 0 is a contraction of the long-run mean of GDP. This formulation has the
advantage of making default less sensitive to GDP shocks. In particular, defaulting with
a GDP level below the threshold of κE[y] there is no GDP penalty. Nevertheless, above
this threshold the GDP penalty increases the higher GDP is.
18We make this assumption to capture a higher correlation between contemporaneous real GDP and
terms of trade. Terms of trade can be considered as exogenous for small open economies as motivated
in Broda (2004). Therefore, previous real GDP affecting contemporaneous terms of trade should be
restricted.
81
We use the Global Financial Database in order to obtain the series of US 10-year
Treasury constant maturity yield. We pick a 10-year Treasury maturity bond because
the EMBI+ series relies on long-term maturity bonds. We fix the risk-free interest rate
as the average yield from 1997Q1 to 2016Q3, which is 1.62%.
The literature show a wide variety of possible elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods. As noted by Ruhl (2008), this elasticity can be small
to account the quarterly fluctuations in trade balances and terms of trade, or high to
account the growth in trade due to trade liberalization. In Kose, Towe and Meredith
(2004) they propose this elasticity of substitution to be 1.05 for Mexico when analyzing
the NAFTA effect on trade. We choose not to use this level due to the different time
span of study we are interested. Nevertheless, we find that other updated papers for
the Mexican economy have a similar elasticity of substitution that considers the trade
liberalization that Mexico has experienced in the past decades. We use the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods presented in Cuadra and Nuguer
(2018) to calibrate η. They use an elasticity of substitution of 1.5556, which implies a
parameter η of -0.3571.
We use the intratemporal condition (3.9) in order to calibrate the home bias param-
eter. Realize that the intratemporal condition can be rewritten as
(cf
C
)1+η
=
(1− λ)P(p;λ, η)
p
(3.13)
In order to construct the series of consumption of foreign goods, we obtain from the
Mexican central bank the annual share of imported consumption goods from total im-
ports from 1997 to 2015. We find that the average share is of 13.18% during this
period.19 Using total imports of goods and services, private final consumption expen-
diture, and terms of trade quarterly series, the parameter value of η = −0.3571, the
fixed share of imported consumption goods, and the final consumption good price index
(3.10) formula; we find a series of the home bias λt that solves in every quarter the
intratemporal condition (3.13). We find that the average home bias is of 0.8748 from
1997Q4 to 2016Q2.
19We also find that from 2007 to 2015 this share almost doubled from 8.5% to 14.24%. We also find
that most of this increase happened in the first six years of the sample. For this reason, we consider
this share as a constant for the calibration process.
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We calibrate the default GDP penalty and the discount factor in order to match
two moments of the Mexican economy. Mexico has defaulted in its sovereign debt twice
(1928 and 1982) in the last hundred years.20 This gives a rough estimate of a 2% default
probability. We then focus the targets to be this default probability and the standard
deviation of trade balance over GDP ratio shown in Table 3.4. Finally, we keep the
probability of re-entry to financial markets proposed by y Arellano (2008).21 Table 3.5
presents the parameters specification from the calibration and estimation strategy.
Table 3.5: Parameters Specification
Parameter Value Source
A
[
0.8399 −0.0291
−0.1466 0.5367
]
OLS estimators
σy 0.0105 Observed errors
σp 0.0203 Observed errors
σ 2.00 IRBC Literature
r∗ 1.62% US 10-year Treasury
η -0.3571 Cuadra and Nuguer (2016)
λ 0.8748 Intratemporal Condition
β 0.9530 Default probability
κ 0.9690 Trade balance volatility
φ 0.2820 Arellano (2008)
20As noted in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), the default years were when two important international
crises happened, the Great Depression and the Emerging Markets Crises. During the Tequila Crisis in
1994, Mexico was close to default with its international lenders. Thanks to the international help from
the USA, Mexico was able to have dodge this.
21In Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris (2011), it is shown that the average waiting period for re-entry after
a default has decreased significantly. They show that this average fell from 5 years in the 1980’s to
1.6 years in the 1990’s. Nevertheless, in Alessandro et al. (2011), they conclude that this comparison
between decades is not fair. In particular, that the decrease in average waiting period for re-entry has
not decreased throughout time. They provide evidence that, if re-entry to to financial markets do not
happen after three years of the default, it is significantly harder to achieve this re-entry. This seems
to suggest that the probability of re-entry has not experienced important movements throughout the
years.
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3.5.3 Results
We use a value function iteration process using a grid search method22 to solve the
model. To study the policy rules we establish a high and low level of GDP and terms of
trade as ±0.0489% and ±0.0467% deviations from their means, respectively. We then
do a 100 simulation processes for the economy for 10,000 periods, starting with zero
sovereign bond holdings and in the long-run level of GDP and terms of trade. We burn
the first 500 periods of each simulation and compute the business cycles statistics of the
model as the averages of the simulations.
Figure 3.3 shows the boundary limits of the default set (3.6). Because of Proposition
3.4.2 we know that these sets are monotonic with respect of the level of sovereign bond
holdings. The left panel shows the relationship with respect of GDP fixing the terms
of trade level. The default set is the area south west of the boundaries. We find that
higher levels of sovereign debt increase the levels of GDP inside the the default set. In
addition, having a higher terms of trade level increases slightly the levels of GDP inside
the default set. The right panel shows the relationship with respect of terms of trade
fixing the GDP level. The default set is the area north west of the boundaries. We find
that higher levels of sovereign debt increase the levels of terms of trad inside the default
set. In addition, having a higher GDP levles decreases significantly the levels of terms
of trade inside the default set.
Figure 3.4 shows the pricing of the sovereign bonds. The left panel shows us how the
sovereign bond price schedule decreases in value as the sovereign bond becomes more
negative. The right panel shows the implied interest rate using the domain of sovereign
bonds in which the sovereign bond pricing is strictly positive. These graphs deliver two
important features. Firstly, this model is able to create countercyclical interest rates due
to the link between probability of default and GDP levels. Secondly, the movements
of terms of trade increase in importance for sovereign bond price schedule as GDP
increases. Moreover, this rise in the price schedule dispersion increases the sovereign
interest rates possibilities. This result helps us explain the movements of spreads during
periods where GDP is not below trend. Furthermore, it suggests that terms of trade
22We use this method as a first approach to solving the equilibrium of the model. As Hatchondo,
Martinez and Sapriza (2010) shows, grid search methods can give spurious results in the business cycle
analysis.
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Figure 3.3: Default Set Boundaries
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matter when analyzing interest rates and default likelihoods of emerging economies.
This is a step towards explaining the puzzle shown in Tomz and Wright (2007).
Figure 3.4: Sovereign Bond Pricing and Sovereign Interest Rate
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Table 3.6 shows the business cycle statistics of the model. The business cycles is able
to recover a couple of the statistics shown in Table 3.4. But in general, the experiment
fails because it is not able to match most of the moments in the data. Despite of this,
it is an important step towards understanding the flaws and improving the model.
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Table 3.6: Model Business Cycles Statistics
Variable µ σ ρ(·,Spread) ρ(·,GDP) ρ(·,TOT)
Spread 0.65% 0.74% - -0.2009 0.2567
GDP - 2.24% -0.2009 - -0.2388
Terms of Trade - 2.52% 0.2567 -0.2388 -
Consumption - 2.01% -0.3073 0.9386 -0.2376
Trade Balance 0.00% 0.09% 0.3788 -0.2628 -0.0385
Default probability 2.46% - - - -
Debt-GDP ratio 3.05% - - - -
3.6 Conclusion
We propose a stochastic general equilibrium model of sovereign default with endogenous
default risk in order to explain the interest rate behavior in emerging economies. We
incorporate two types of shocks to cover a foreign and a domestic uncertainty. We define
as the domestic and the foreign uncertainty, GDP and terms of trade shock, respectively.
The model is able to successfully increase the dispersion of sovereign interest rates when
GDP shocks are above the trend. This result seems to suggest that terms of trade is a
good candidate to explain the volatility of interest rates in small open economies when
they are not under recessions or crises.
Unfortunately, our business cycles exercise has room for improvements. Neverthe-
less, the results presented is a great step to explain the behavior of interest rates in
emerging economies. Below, we present three issues we are currently working in order
to improve our line of research.
Firstly, the VAR(1) process does not capture correctly the dynamics between GDP
and terms of trade shown in the data. This can be shown by the small correlation
between their contemporaneous realizations in the simulation process. In particular, we
are confident that E [εyt | ln pt] 6= 0, making our estimators in A biased. Moreover, we are
not implementing completely the exogeneity assumption of terms of trade. Specifically,
we let the future realization of terms of trade be affected by the current level of GDP.
Furhter work of the model will consider improvements in the VAR(1) process presented
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in (3.1), for example[
ln yt+1
ln pt+1
]
=
[
a1 a2
0 a3
][
ln yt
ln pt
]
+
[
1 b1
0 1
][
εyt−1
εpt=1
]
.
Another weakness of our results is our calibration strategy. We let the tolerance
in the algorithm to be high for a faster convergence. The tolerance provided is of
1.0e−1, which yields really loose results. Moreover, we only do one simulation process
in order to compute the target statistics of default probability and standard deviation of
trade balance over GDP. Future improvements will encompass a more serious calibration
process with a higher tolerance and number of simulation processes. Moreover, we will
include as part of it the probability of re-entry to financial markets by targeting the
ratio of debt over GDP.
Finally, our computation of the equilibrium can improve greatly. Unfortunately,
having three state variables increases greatly the computational cost in terms of time.
Because of this we have coarse grids that might miss important movements. Further-
more, as noted by y Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza (2010), grid search methods can
yield spurious results in the business cycles statistics of the model. Future improve-
ments will work on this by imposing finer grids in the state variables. In addition, we
will move from the grid search method to methods that are able to capture movements
between the grid elements.23
23There are a great variety of methods that allow movements inside the grid elements. In particular,
we are currently working on linear and quadratic interpolation methods. We are also interested in im-
plementing innovative methods that have shown efficiency in solving these types of models. Specifically,
we are interested in the algorithms provided in McGrattan (1996) and Gordon and Qiu (2018).
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Data
All data is annual data from 1980 to 2016. The data availability varies by countries so
countries with missing data on their exports, real GDP are dropped from the sample.
Consequently, the final sample consists of 50 countries. All data is obtained from the
World Development Indicators (WDI).
• Exports : The dollar value of exporting goods and services.
• Growth rate of GDP: Growth rate is calculated with Growth rate of real GDP per
capita. The real GDP is expressed in local currency.
• Foreign reserves: Gross foreign exchange reserves minus gold.
A.1.1 Export-orientation
The following table (A.1) and table (A.2) list export-oriented countries and non export-
oriented countries in the sample. It presents the growth of exports to GDP ratio.
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Table A.1: countries with a export growth policy
Country g
(
Exports
GDP
) (
Exports
GDP
)
1980
(
Exports
GDP
)
2016
Argentina 0.99 0.09 0.18
Bhutan 1.34 0.18 0.42
Bolivia 0.73 0.23 0.40
Burkina 1.11 0.10 0.20
China 1.71 0.10 0.27
Ecuador 0.66 0.17 0.28
Guatemala 0.52 0.16 0.24
Hong Kong 0.95 1.02 2.00
India 2.74 0.06 0.22
Israel 1.31 0.11 0.25
Korea 0.65 0.29 0.48
Mexico 0.87 0.16 0.31
Mongolia 0.85 0.27 0.50
Sudan 0.98 0.07 0.15
Syria 1.48 0.16 0.39
Thailand 1.65 0.26 0.69
Turkey 0.68 0.13 0.22
Uganda 0.62 0.12 0.19
Vietnam 6.70 0.10 0.78
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Table A.2: countries without a export growth policy
Country g
(
Exports
GDP
) (
Exports
GDP
)
1980
(
Exports
GDP
)
2016
Bahamas -0.42 0.64 0.37
Belize 0.06 0.55 0.59
Brazil 0.20 0.10 0.12
Burundi -0.25 0.10 0.08
Colombia 0.15 0.14 0.17
Costa Rica 0.11 0.31 0.35
Dominican Republic 0.02 0.24 0.25
Egypt -0.05 0.22 0.21
El Salvador 0.22 0.22 0.27
Indonesia -0.01 0.26 0.25
Liberia -0.43 0.62 0.35
Nepal -0.02 0.11 0.11
Pakistan 0.03 0.12 0.12
Senegal -0.02 0.27 0.27
South Africa 0.09 0.28 0.31
Uruguay 0.20 0.21 0.26
Vanuatu 0.04 0.42 0.43
Venezula 0.10 0.24 0.27
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A.2 Benevolent government allocation
In this appendix, the benevolent government allocations are characterized. The benev-
olent government chooses {cDt , cFt , ct, xt, At+1}t≥0 to solve the benevolent government
problem (2.16) The first order conditions of the government’s problem are
βtu1(c
D
t , c
F
t ) = λt (A.1)
βtu2(c
D
t , c
F
t ) = µt (A.2)
βR
(
pt+1
pt
)
µt+1 = µt (A.3)
µt
λt
= pt − pt
[
αζ(γt)
ζγ (xt)
1−ζx
(
λt+1
λt
Yt+1
γt+1
)]
(A.4)
λt and µt are the Lagrange multiplier associated with (2.12) and (2.14) respectively.
Substituting (A.1) and (A.2) into (A.4) and using the functional forms for the CRRA
utility and the CES aggregate consumption, I can obtain
u2(c
D
t , c
F
t )
u1(cDt , c
F
t )
= pt − pt
[
αζ(γt)
ζγ (xt)
1−ζx
(
λt+1
λt
Yt+1
γt+1
)]
(A.5)
= pt − pt
[
αζ(γt)
ζγ (xt)
1−ζx
(
u1(c
D
t+1, c
F
t+1)
u1(cDt , c
F
t )
Yt+1
γt+1
)]
(A.6)
= pt − pt
[
(pt)
−φ(1−ζx)αζ(γt)ζγ
(
u1(c
D
t+1, c
F
t+1)
u1(cDt , c
F
t )
Yt+1
γt+1
)]
(A.7)
= pt
(
1− p−φ(1−ζx)t Ψt
)
(A.8)
where Ψt = αζ(γt)
ζγ
(
u1(cDt+1,c
F
t+1)
u1(cDt ,c
F
t )
Yt+1
γt+1
)
The (A.8) is equivalent to the equation (2.17)
and the management of foreign reserves are implied by this expression.
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A.3 Competitive Equilibrium allocation for the economy
with private savings
This appendix provides the characterization of the competitive equilibrium for the econ-
omy with private savings. The consumer chooses {cDt , cFt , ct, st+1}t≥0 and the first order
conditions are
pt =
u2(c
D
t , c
F
t )
u1(cDt , c
F
t )
(A.9)
βR
(
pt+1
pt
)
λst+1 = λ
s
t (A.10)
(A.11)
where λst is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (2.20). The equation (A.9) equates
the terms of trade and marginal rate of substitution and the equation (A.10) is the Euler
equation. The definition of competitive equilibrium for this economy is shown below.
Definition 5. Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium for the small open economy with private saving is defined
by a set of the representative consumer’s allocations {cDt , cFt , st+1}t≥0, the representa-
tive firm’s allocations {Yt, Lt, qdt , xt}t≥0, the terms of trade and the wages {pt, wt}, and
the stock of knowledge {γt+1}t≥0, given initial savings, initial knowledge stock, foreign
output, and productivity, {s0γ0, Y ?, z} such that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. Consumer: Given {pt, wt, pit}t≥0, the consumer’s allocations {cDt , cFt , st+1}t≥0 strat-
ifies optimality condition (A.9).
2. Firm: Given {pt, γt, Y ?, z}t≥0, the firm chooses {Yt, Lt, qdt , xt, pit}t≥0 satisfying
(2.4), (2.5), (2.6), and (2.11).
3. The market for tradable goods clears as (2.12) and trade balance satisfies (2.25).
4. The knowledge stock evolves according to (2.7).
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Proposition Proof
B.1.1 Proposition 3.4.1 (Recursive Equilibrium Isomorphism)
Proof. Let us use this intratemporal condition (3.9) and the household’s final consump-
tion aggregator,
C =
(
λc−ηd + (1− λ)c−ηf
)− 1
η
= cd
(
λ
(
1 +
(
1− λ
λ
)(
cd
cf
)η))− 1η
= cd
(
λ
(
1 +
(
1− λ
λ
)((
λ
1− λ
)
p
) η
1+η
))− 1
η
= cd
(
λ
(
1 +
(
1− λ
λ
) 1
1+η
p
η
1+η
))− 1
η
=
(
cd
λ
1
1+η
)(
λ
1
1+η + (1− λ) 11+η p η1+η
)− 1
η
.
Using the final consumption good price index (3.10), we can rewrite the previous ex-
pression as
c1+ηd
λ
= P(p)C1+η. (B.1)
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Using the intratemporal condition (3.9) and mixing the budget and the balanced trade
constraints of (3.4) and (3.5), we can realize that the consumption of domestic and
foreign expenditure can be expressed as
cd + pcf = cd +
(
1− λ
λ
)(
cd
cf
)1+η
cf
= cd +
(
1− λ
λ
)
c1+ηd c
−η
f
=
(
c1+ηd
λ
)(
λc−ηd + (1− λ)c−ηf
)
=
c1+ηd
λCη
.
Thus, using (B.1) we reach the expression that the household’s consumption expenditure
can be expressed in terms of the final consumption good and the final consumption good
price index (3.10),
cd + pcf = P(p)C.
Furthermore, using (3.9) and (B.1), we can construct how the consumption of domestic
and foreign goods can be decomposed from the aggregate final consumption good as
cd = (λP(p))
1
1+η C and cf =
(
(1− λ)P(p)
p
) 1
1+η
C.
Finally, realize that the restrictions of the maximization problems (3.4) and (3.5) are
the same as the ones described in (3.11) and (3.12).  
B.1.2 Proposition 3.4.2 (Default Sets Monotonicity)
Proof. Set a level of sovereign debt B1 and levels of output and terms of trade such that
(y, p) ∈ D(B1). Then, it follows that V D(y, p) > V R(B1, y, p). Pick an arbitrary level
of sovereign debt B2 such that B2 ≤ B1. Let us study the resource constraint in (3.11).
Define the budget set of the government contingent to the amount of sovereign bonds
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due as
B(B) = {(C,B′) ∈ R+ × [B,∞) : P (p)C + pq(B′, y, p) ≤ y + pB} .
By construction, acknowledge that B(B2) ⊆ B(B1). Because the government is maxi-
mizing over a subset of a set, it follows that V R(B1, y, p) ≥ V R(B2, y, p). Joining the
inequalities, we conclude that
V D(y, p) > V R(B1, y, p) ≥ V R(B2, y, p).
In other words, (y, p) ∈ D(B2). Finally, because the levels of sovereign debt B2 was
taken arbitrarily, we can conclude that D(B1) ⊆ D(B2).  
B.1.3 Proposition 3.4.3 (No Resources Inflows)
Proof. Pick an arbitrary (y, p) ∈ D(B) and realize this implies V D(y, p) > V R(B, y, p).
Acknowledge that the resource constraints found in (3.11) and in (3.12) can be rewritten
respectively as
C =
y
P(p) −
p
P(p)
(
q(B′)B′ −B) and C = yP(p) .
Therefore,
u
(
y
P(p)
)
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V D(y′, p′)
]
> max
B′
{
u
(
y − p(q(B′)B′ −B)
P(p)
)
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (y′, p′)
]}
≥ max
B′
{
u
(
y − p(q(B′)B′ −B)
P(p)
)
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V D(y′, p′)
]}
≥ u
(
y − p(q(B′)B′ −B)
P(p)
)
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V D(y′, p′)
]
,
for all feasible B′. Thus,
u
(
y
P(p)
)
> u
(
y
P(p) −
p
P(p)
(
q(B′)B′ −B)) .
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Because u(·) is an increasing function,
y
P(p) ≥
y
P(p) −
p
P(p)
(
q(B′)B′ −B) .
Then, we arrive to
q(B′)B′ −B ≥ 0.
Finally, because we picked an arbitrary (y, p) ∈ D(B), we can conclude that for all
feasible B′ there are no resources inflows, q(B′)B′ −B ≥ 0.  
B.1.4 Proposition 3.4.4 (GDP Default Incentives)
Proof. Set a level of GDP, terms of trade and sovereign bonds such that (y1, p) ∈ D(B) 6=
∅. Then, it follows that V D(y1, p) > V R(B, y1, p). Pick an arbitrary level of GDP y2
such that y2 ≤ y1. Acknowledge that the resource constraints found in (3.11) and in
(3.12) can be rewritten respectively as
C =
y
P(p) −
p
P(p)
(
q(B′)B′ −B) and C = yP(p) .
To make the proof easier, call
B′1 = arg max
B′
{
u
(
y1
P(p) −
p
P(p)
(
q(B′1)B
′
1 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′1, y
′, p′)
]}
and
B′2 = arg max
B′
{
u
(
y2
P(p) −
p
P(p)
(
q(B′2)B
′
2 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′2, y
′, p′)
]}
.
Realize that, in particular, these expressions imply,
u
(
y1
P(p) −
p
P(p)
(
q(B′1)B
′
1 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′1, y
′, p′)
] ≥
u
(
y1
P(p) −
p
P(p)
(
q(B′2)B
′
2 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′2, y
′, p′)
]
.
Using Proposition 3.4.3 and because D(B) 6= ∅ and u(·) is increasing, it follows that
q(B′)B′ − B ≥ 0 for every feasible B′. In particular, for the optimal level of sovereign
bonds using y2 level of GDP, q(B
′
2)B
′
2 −B ≥ 0.
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Because u(·) is strictly concave and q(B′2)B′2 −B ≥ 0, we know that
u
(
y1
P(p) −
p
P(p)
(
q(B′2)B
′
2 −B
))− u( y2P(p) − pP(p) (q(B′2)B′2 −B)
)
≥ u
(
y1
P(p)
)
− u
(
y1
P(p)
)
.
Moreover, the right-hand side can be expressed as
u
(
y1
P(p)
)
− u
(
y2
P(p)
)
=
(
u
(
y1
P(p)
)
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (y′, p′)
])− (u( y2P(p)
)
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (y′, p′)
])
= V D(y1, p)− V D(y2, p).
Therefore,
V D(y1, p)− V D(y2, p)
≤ u
(
y1
P(p) −
p
P(p)
(
q(B′2)B
′
2 −B
))− u( y2P(p) − pP(p) (q(B′2)B′2 −B)
)
=
(
u
(
y1
P(p) −
p
P(p)
(
q(B′2)B
′
2 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′2, y
′, p′)
])
−
(
u
(
y2
P(p) −
p
P(p)
(
q(B′2)B
′
2 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′2, y
′, p′)
])
≤
(
u
(
y1
P(p) −
p
P(p)
(
q(B′1)B
′
1 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′1, y
′, p′)
])
−
(
u
(
y2
P(p) −
p
P(p)
(
q(B′2)B
′
2 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′2, y
′, p′)
])
= V R(B, y1, p)− V R(B, y2, p) < V D(y1, p)− V R(B, y2, p).
Then we arrive to following expression V D(y2, p) > V
R(B, y2, p). Finally we can
conclude, because the level of GDP y2 was taken arbitrarily, we can conclude that
(y2, p) ∈ D(B).  
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B.1.5 Proposition 3.4.5 (Terms of Trade Default Incentives)
Proof. Set a level of GDP, terms of trade and sovereign bonds such that (y, p1) ∈
D(B) 6= ∅. Then, it follows that V D(y, p1) > V R(B, y, p1). Pick an arbitrary level of
terms of trade p2 such that p2 ≥ p1. Acknowledge that the resource constraints found
in (3.11) and in (3.12) can be rewritten respectively as
C =
y
P(p) −
p
P(p)
(
q(B′)B′ −B) and C = yP(p) .
To make the proof easier, call
B′1 = arg max
B′
{
u
(
y
P(p1) −
p1
P(p1)
(
q(B′1)B
′
1 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′1, y
′, p′)
]}
and
B′2 = arg max
B′
{
u
(
y
P(p2) −
p2
P(p2)
(
q(B′2)B
′
2 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′2, y
′, p′)
]}
.
Realize that, in particular, these expressions imply,
u
(
y
P(p1) −
p1
P(p1)
(
q(B′1)B
′
1 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′1, y
′, p′)
] ≥
u
(
y
P(p1) −
p1
P(p1)
(
q(B′2)B
′
2 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′2, y
′, p′)
]
.
Using Proposition 3.4.3 and because D(B) 6= ∅ and u(·) is increasing, it follows that
q(B′)B′ − B ≥ 0 for every feasible B′. In particular, for the optimal level of sovereign
bonds using y2 level of GDP, q(B
′
2)B
′
2 −B ≥ 0.
Acknowledge that the final consumption good price index is increasing,
P ′(p) =
(
(1− λ)P(p)
p
) 1
1+η
>≥ 0.
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Therefore, the ratio pP(p) is increasing too,
d
dp
(
p
P(p)
)
=
P(p)− pP ′(p)
(P(p))2
=
1− (1− λ) 11+η p η1+η (P(p))− η1+η
P(p)
=
(P(p)) η1+η − (1− λ) 11+η p η1+η
(P(p)) 1+2η1+η
=
(
λ
(P(p))1+2η
) 1
1+η
≥ 0.
In other words, it follows that p2P(p2) ≥
p1
P(p1) because p2 ≥ p1.
Using the previous result and because u(·) is strictly concave and q(B′2)B′2−B ≥ 0,
we know that
u
(
y
P(p1)
)
− u
(
y
P(p2)
)
≤ u
(
y
P(p1) −
p2
P(p2)
(
q(B′2)B
′
2 −B
))− u( yP(p2) − p2P(p2) (q(B′2)B′2 −B)
)
≤ u
(
y
P(p1) −
p1
P(p1)
(
q(B′2)B
′
2 −B
))− u( yP(p2) − p2P(p2) (q(B′2)B′2 −B)
)
Moreover, the left-hand side can be expressed as
u
(
y
P(p1)
)
− u
(
y
P(p2)
)
=
(
u
(
y
P(p1)
)
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (y′, p′)
])− (u( yP(p2)
)
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (y′, p′)
])
= V D(y, p1)− V D(y, p2).
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Therefore,
V D(y, p1)− V D(y, p2)
≤ u
(
y
P(p1) −
p1
P(p1)
(
q(B′2)B
′
2 −B
))− u( yP(p2) − p2P(p2) (q(B′2)B′2 −B)
)
=
(
u
(
y
P(p1) −
p1
P(p1)
(
q(B′2)B
′
2 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′2, y
′, p′)
])
−
(
u
(
y
P(p2) −
p2
P(p2)
(
q(B′2)B
′
2 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′2, y
′, p′)
])
≤
(
u
(
y
P(p1) −
p1
P(p1)
(
q(B′1)B
′
1 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′1, y
′, p′)
])
−
(
u
(
y
P(p2) −
p2
P(p)
(
q(B′2)B
′
2 −B
))
+ βE(y′,p′)
[
V (B′2, y
′, p′)
])
= V R(B, y, p1)− V R(B, y, p2)
< V D(y, p1)− V R(B, y, p2).
Then we arrive to following expression V D(y, p2) > V
R(B, y, p2). Finally we can con-
clude, because the level of terms of trade p2 was taken arbitrarily, we can conclude that
(y, p2) ∈ D(B).  
B.2 Computational Algorithm
We extend the algorithm described in Arellano (2008) and incorporate the one loop
enhancement proposed in Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2010) using a grid search
method. The following is the algorithm we follow to solve the model proposed in Def-
inition 4 and the calibration strategy for the discount factor β and the GDP default
penalty parameter κ:
1) Fix the calibration targets of default probability d¯ and standard deviation of trade
balance over GDP s¯.
2) Discretize B space and discretize (y,p) space using Tauchen and Hussey (1991).
3) Propose a guess for the discount factor β and the GDP default penalty parameter
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κ,
β = 0.95 andκ = 1.00
4) Propose a guess for the set of value functions V , V R, V D and the sovereign bond
price schedule q,
V = [0], V R = [0], V D = [0], and q =
[
1
1 + r∗
]
.
5) For every state (B, y, p), solve the repayment state maximization problem (3.11)
and compute an implied repayment state value function Vˆ R.
6) For every state (y, p), solve the repayment state maximization problem (3.12) and
compute an implied default state value function Vˆ D.
7) For every state (B, y, p), solve the maximization problem (3.3) and compute an
implied default state value function Vˆ .
8) Using the implied value functions Vˆ R and Vˆ D, construct default set D
9) Using the default set D, construct default probability schedule δ
10) Using the default probability schedule δ, construct an implied sovereign bond price
schedule qˆ
11) Compute the error term as
z1 = ||V − Vˆ ||∞ + ||V R − Vˆ R||∞ + ||V D − Vˆ D||∞ + ||q − qˆ||∞.
12) Update guesses V = Vˆ , V R = Vˆ R, V D = Vˆ D, and q = qˆ.
13) If z1 ≥ 1.0e−6, return to 5).
14) Construct one simulation of 10,000 periods with 500 burn-ins starting with the
zero sovereign bonds and the long-run levels of GDP and terms of trade
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15) Construct the implied default probability α and the implied standard deviation
of trade balance over GDP s
16) Compute the error term as
z2 =
∣∣d− d¯∣∣+ |s− s¯|
2
.
17) If z2 ≥ 1.0e−1, update guesses β and κ, then return to 4)
